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A SIMPLE CODE OF ETHICS: A HISTORY OF THE
MORAL PURPOSE INSPIRING FEDERAL
REGULATION OF THE SECURITIES INDUSTRY
John H. Walsh:

I.

INTRODUCTION

The idea that government regulation can serve a moral purpose has
fallen into disrepute. Professor Henry G. Manne, an influential legal

scholar,' has been particularly outspoken in this regard. "Morals," he
wrote, "are a private luxury. Carried into the arena of serious debate on
public policy, moral arguments are frequently either sham or a refuge for
the intellectually bankrupt."2
Indeed, he suggests, to make a personal statement about the

immorality of a particular type of securities transaction is to confuse
oneself with God.? It was not always so. In the early years of the last

century, the Progressives4 believed government had a "moral and a

* John . Walsh, J.D., Georgetown University Law Center Ph.D. lHistor) . Boston
College, is Chief Counsel in the Office of Compliance Inspections and Examinations of the United
States Securities and Exchange Commission. The Commission, as a matter of policy. dilaims
responsibility for any private publication or statement by any of its emplo)ees. The 'iets expre. ed
herein are those of the Author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Commission or the
Author's colleagues on the Commission's staff. The Author also sihes to note that many
statements from the 1930s contain gender-specific terms that may no longer te appropriate. WVhzn
using quotations, the Author has not removed or modified these terms because he belieces the
sources should speak in their own words.
I. See generally Symposium, The Legacy of Henry G. Manne-Piancer in Ln, &
Economics and Innovator in Legal Education, 50 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 203 (1999) Idiscusming
Manne's influence and contributions to corporate law and economics .
2. Henry G. Manne, Insider Trading and the Law Professors, 23 VAt.D. L REv. 547, 549
(1970).
3. See id.
4. Progressivism was a reform movement that swept through the United States in the )ea.
after 1900, and extended into the period of the First World War. See gcnerally Ricatto
HOSTADTER, THE AGEOF REFORM: FRoM BRYANTO F.D.R. 3-11 (8th prig. 1968).
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magisterial mission. ' In their view, this included "a broad responsibility
for uplifting society." 6 They crusaded for honesty,' and in doing so, they
saw "themselves as the harbingers of a new moral era."8 In the 1930s,
the Progressives' movement gave way to the era of the New Deal. 9 Even
as Progressivism appeared to triumph in the New Deal,' ° contemporaries
came to believe that the Progressives' focus on moral character had
distracted them from the real work of government." Contemporaries
withdrew human character from the range of their reforms." In the
future, they said, government should be like "engineering"-"cold and
analytical."' 3 In the years since, as illustrated by Professor Manne, the
role of morality in public policy has fallen ever lower. Perforce, when its
role is to serve as distraction, sham, or refuge for the intellectually
bankrupt, it is safe to say that the age of moral purpose in regulation is
over.
Despite current opinion, the important role moral purpose played in
creating modem regulatory institutions should not be forgotten. To
understand the regulatory regimes our predecessors created and
bequeathed to the modem age, one must understand the fundamental
impulses that inspired them. Now ignored, or even disavowed, moral
purpose once served as such an impulse. This is an area where history
has something to offer the law. The greater the modem age's subjective
distance from the regulatory vision of an earlier era, the more law needs
history to explain what our predecessors thought they were doing.
Moral purpose played a fundamental role in creating the federal
regulatory regime for the securities industry. Indeed, in many respects,
even though federal regulation was a product of the 1930s, it reflected an
orthodox Progressive sensibility.' This was no accident. In the spring of
5. Wilson Carey McWilliams, Standing at Armageddon: Morality and Religion in
Progressive Thought, in PROGRESSIVISM AND THE NEW DEMOCRACY 103, 106 (Sidney M. Milkis
& Jerome M. Mileur eds., 1999) [hereinafter PROGRESSIVISM].

6. Id.
7. See Alonzo L. Hamby, Progressivism: A Century of Birth and Rebirth, in
PROGRESSIVISM, supra note 5, at 40, 44.
8. EDGAR KEMLER, THE DEFLATION OF AMERICAN IDEALS: AN ETHICAL GUIDE FOR NEW
DEALERS 56 (1967).
9. See HOFSTADTER, supra note 4, at 3.
10. The New Deal was the popular name given to President Franklin D. Roosevelt's ("FDR")
domestic legislative program. It has spawned a vast literature. See generally WILLIAM E.
LEUCHTENBURG, THE FDR YEARS: ON ROOSEVELT AND His LEGACY 234-35 (1995) (summarizing
a number of bibliographies and works on the New Deal).
11. See KEMLER, supranote 8, at 49.
12. See id. at 44.
13. Id. at 44-45.
14. See infra Part III.
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1932, when Franklin Delano Roosevelt ("FDR") began his campaign for
the Presidency of the United States, the potential shape of the future
regulatory regime was fluid and open.'" At least initially, FDR's policies
were shaped by advisers steeped in the "engineering" spirit of the
1930s.' 6 The candidate publicly adopted their views. 7 Yet, after he had
won the Democratic Party's nomination, he fell under the influence of
orthodox Progressives. In August 1932, FDR turned to a moral policy
vision.'" His purpose, he decided, was to ensure the character of the
people who composed the securities industry." He presented this vision
to the country in moral terms, and after his election, FDR suggested that
his purpose could be implemented with a simple code of ethics.-'
Moreover, when the work of creating law and regulation began in
earnest, FDR's moral purpose was carried forward by Congress and the
newly created Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC" or
"Commission"). 2 ' This Article's thesis is that FDR's moral purpose was
a deliberately chosen policy and, once chosen, that it played an
important role in the creation of the federal regulatory regime. To
understand the most fundamental impulses in federal regulation of the
securities industry, one must understand this Progressive moral vision.
This is a history of ideas. FDR's vision was a particular type of
idea: a series of statements, all set at a very high level of generality,
about the concerns of a future regulatory regime. FDR stated his vision
in the context and language of a presidential campaign and transition.2
Not surprisingly, he was long on rhetoric and short on specifics.
Moreover, once legislators and administrators took up his ideas, and
sought to give them substance, FDR was increasingly detached from the
policy process 23 Nonetheless, FDR played a critical role in the history of

15. See LEUCHTmNBURG, supra note 10, at 46.
16. See id. at24-25.

17. See infraPartILA.1.
18. See infra Part I.A.2.
19. See infra text accompanying notes 194-95.
20. See infra Part ILC.

21. The Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC" or "Commission"! is a federal
regulatory agency established by the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to administer the fedzral
securities laws. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934. ch. 404, § 4(a). 48 Stat. 881, 885 11934
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78(d) (1994)).
22. See infra Part IL

23. See infra Part II (discussing, throughout, the congressional debates ower the tv'.o
securities acts and the amendments that were made thereto).
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these ideas. 24 He selected them, he pronounced them, and he made them
the policy foundation for the laws and regulations to come.2
This is also a history of how legislators, administrators, and
ultimately judges responded to these ideas. FDR's moral purpose
inspired a variety of regulatory measures, including: prohibiting conduct
inconsistent with ethical principles; 26 empowering the SEC to preserve
the character of the securities industry by expelling the unfit; 27 and
requiring securities exchanges and associations to adopt rules enforcing
just and equitable principles of trade.28 These measures carry the force of
law. They are not, therefore, ethical principles in the usual sense of the
term.2 ' Nonetheless, contemporaries repeatedly indicated that they
believed their actions would enhance Wall Street's character, including
its moral responsibility, honesty, trustworthiness, and professionalism. °
In other words, while contemporaries built the regulatory regime with
laws, rules, and judicial doctrines, they explained and justified their
actions with moral aspirations. Those aspirations reflect the continuing
influence of FDR's policy vision.
This Article is comprised of five Parts. Part II describes how FDR
selected his policy vision during the presidential campaign of 1932. Part
III focuses on how moral aspirations played a significant role in the
creation of the legislative and administrative institutions of the
regulatory regime. Part IV describes how a seminal appellate case in the
early 1940s reflected these ideas and foreshadowed several of the legal
doctrines of the modem regulatory regime. This Article concludes by
positing that FDR's moral vision was more than a political posture-it
was a serious policy initiative whose effects can still be seen in the
regulatory regime. Moreover, in recent years, moral trustworthiness has
received renewed attention as a significant force in the creation of

24. See infra Part LI.A.
25. See 77 CONG. REc. 937 (1933) (message from the President).
26. See infra text accompanying notes 282-94. For purposes of this Article, the term "morals"
will be applied to general aspirations and the term "ethics" to specific principles of conduct.
27. See infra Part IJI.C.1.
28. See infra Part LI.C.2.
29. Laws and ethical principles are generally distinguished in the sense that the former consist
of rules and regulations set down and enforced by legitimate authority, while the latter consist of
fundamental principles that apply irrespective of the existence of law and are usually dictated by
individual conscience. See ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ETHICS 155 (R. Shannon Duval et a. eds., 1999).
30. See, e.g., 78 CONG. REC. 8161 (1934) (statement of Sen. Fletcher) (asserting that such
legislation would restore "moral and economic conduct" and "social responsibility" to the securities
industry); 77 CONG. REC. 2953 (1933) (statement of Rep. Beedy) (commending and endorsing
measures that "aim[] to make prospectuses honest" and implement standards of "business
morality").
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prosperity." In light of this new thinking, one must wonder whether the
orthodox Progressives who shaped FDR's vision were onto something.
Perhaps moral purpose has a place in securities regulation after all.
II.

FRANKLIN DELANO ROOSEVELT'S POLICY VISION FOR THE
SECURITIES INDUSTRY

In 1929, after a sharp crash on the New York Stock Exchange,"e
security prices fell into a staggering decline. 3 By 1932, common stocks
had lost almost ninety percent of their pre-crash value.?" This
catastrophic loss of value shocked the saving and investing middle
class." The entire economy fell into a Depression, with severe
unemployment and deflation in asset values. ' A Senate Committee

investigated the crash, and revealed shocking misconduct by bankers and
businesspersons.37 This economic crisis, and its associated scandals,
dominated the politics and policy making of the early 1930s.
A.

The PresidentialCampaign of 1932

In the spring of 1932, FDR, then Governor of New York, began his
campaign for the Presidency of the United States." To assist him in
developing and articulating policy positions, he recruited a group of
Columbia University professors. 9 This group would soon be called the
"Brains Trust." It consisted of Raymond Moley, a professor of criminal

31. See infra text accompanying notes 608-22.
32. See generally JOHN KENNETH GALBRArrH, THE GRE,%T CRASH 1929. at 93-132 12d cd.
1961).

33. See id. at 95.
34. See VINCENT P. CAROSSO, INvEsiENr BANKING INAMERIcA: A HISToRY 306 1970).
35. See T.H. WATKuNs, THE GREAT DEPRESSION: AMERICA tN THE 1930s. at 51 ( 1993)
(stating that even for those who did not suffer losses in the crash, it "bacame the one event on vhich
tens of millions could fix their worry as the full dimensions of the debacle slovly began to bia
discerned").
36. There is a large literature, well beyond the scope of this Article, on v hether the crash in
securities prices caused the more general Depression. See, e.g., William M. Isaac & Melanie L
Fein, Facing the Future-Life Without Glass-Steagall,37 CATH. U. L REV. 281, 286 n.22 (1938);
Michael P. Kenny & Teresa D. Thebaut, Misguided Statuton, Construction to Cover the Corporate

Universe: 77e Misappropriation 7heory of Section 101b). 59 ALB. L RE%. 139, 146-47, 147 n.44
(1995); Paul G. Mahoney, The Exchange as Regulator,83 VA L REV. 1453, 1464 (1997hp
37. See generally CAROSSO. supra note 34. at 322-51; JOEL SEtiGMi, THE
TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET: A HISTORY OF THE SECURITIES AND EXHANGE COMISSION
AND MODERN CORPORATE FNANCE 13-38 (1982).
38. See LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 10, at 4647.
39. See R.G. TUGWEL., THE BRAINS TRUST xi-xii (1968) [hereinafter TIrGwmaL. BraI;S

TRUST].
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justice, Rexford Tugwell, an economist, and Adolf Berle, a professor in
the law school.4
1. First Vision: Control and Planning
When the Brains Trust set out to advise FDR, they approached their
task from a decided point of view. They believed that the American
economy was becoming concentrated into a small number of huge
corporations. As Berle stated in The Modern Corporation and Private
Property' two hundred non-financial corporations controlled nearly half
of America's corporate wealth.42 Industrial concentration, he concluded,
had reached the point that modem corporations could compete on equal
terms with the state. In the future, he said, they might even supersede
the state "as the dominant form of social organization."' ' Moreover, in
Berle's view, because of the dispersion of stock ownership, the small
number of individuals who controlled these corporations" enjoyed "a
new form of absolutism" over their institutions. 6
Expressing concern about the power of economic autocrats sounds
much like the orthodox Progressive canon. In the early twentieth
century, Progressives believed that the great corporations had destroyed
the economic individualism of an earlier America. The Brains Trusters,
however, were not orthodox Progressives.
Where traditional
Progressives feared these huge concentrations of economic power and
wanted to break them up,49 the Brains Trust welcomed them as a source
of mass production. Instead of breaking them up, the Brains Trust
wanted to bring them under government control. Specifically, Tugwell
40. See id. The name "Brains Trust" would eventually be applied to a large number of people.
In this Article it will be applied only to the small group who were regularly present in campaign
policy meetings in the spring of 1932. See REXFORD G. TUOWELL, THE DEMocRATIc ROOSEVELT
215 (1957) [hereinafter TUGWELL, DEMOCRATIC ROOSEVELT] (stating that Moley, Berle, and
Tugwell were the only ones regularly present).
41.

ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND

PRIVATE PROPERTY (1933).
42. See id. at 32.
43. See id. at 357.
44. Id.
45. See id. at 46 n.34.
46. See id. at 124.
47. See HOFSTADTER, supra note 4, at 5.
48. See RAYMOND MOLEY, AFTER SEVEN YEARS 24 (1939) [hereinafter MOLEY, AFTER
SEVEN YEARS].
49. See HOFSTADTER, supra note 4, at 227, 236.
50. See MOLEY, AFTER SEVEN YEARS, supra note 48, at 24 (stating that "any attempt to
atomize big business must destroy America's greatest contribution to a higher standard of living for
the body of its citizenry").
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said that the government "must set the goals for production and, if
necessary, direct investments and establish fair standards for all

concerned."'" In the Brains Trust's view, the techniques of scientific
management had made such control and planning both possible and

desirable."- As one could expect, this pro'gram had significant
implications for the securities industry.
In The IndustrialDiscipline and the Governmental Arts,"' Tugwell
discussed how the allocation of capital in the economy could be placed

under federal control- The first step would be to limit self-allocaton."
In its place, a planning agency would assign capital to industries and
then apportion the allotted capital among the firms in each industry,
based on each firm's size, contribution to the national output, superior

efficiency, or other criteria. 6 Tugwell also suggested that the need to

sub-apportion capital would likely decline as the federal administration
used combination and association to closely articulate the independent

firms presently making up each industry." In other words, a federal
planning agency, not the securities industry, would operate the process

by which capital is allocated through the economy.
These views were strongly expressed in the Brains Trust's policy
advice. In May 1932, Berle gave the candidate a memorandum entitled
The Nature of the Difficulty.." The memorandum analyzed the nation's
51. TUOG\ELL, BRAINS TRusT, supra note 39, at 174. In rejecting orthodox Progressive 'ievs,
the Brains Trust drew on the writing of Charles Van Hise, a leading exponent of the bznilts of
large-scale concentrated business. See RAYMOND MoLEY, THE FIRST NeWi DL'u. 225 1!966)
[hereinafter MOLEY, FIRST NEw DEAL]; see also CHAPLES R. VAN HtsE, Co.Ncrl-mTtO:. bV;D
CONTROL: A SOLUTION OF THE TRUST PROBLEM INTHE UNrrED STATES 8-20 (1912) (discussing
the economic advantages of concentration). The Brains Trust was also influenced by th:
mobilization of the economy during World War I, both as an example of government man3ement
of the economy, and as a metaphor for concerted social action. See LEuCHTENBURG, supra note 10,
at 36-40.
52. See TUGxvELL, BRAINS TRUST, supra note 39, at 133: sce also RXT-OtD TULGELL,
INDUSTrRY'S COMING OF AGE 29 (1927) (discussing enhanced productivity mada Possible by
scientific management).
53. RExFoRD G. TUGWELL, THE INDUSTRIAL DISCIPLINE AND Tue GOVERNMENTAL ARTS
(1933) [hereinafter TUG\VELL, INDUSTRIAL DISCIPLINE]. This work was published in 1933. but had
already been written at the time of the 1932 campaign. See Rexford G. Tugwell. The Spring of
Thirty-Two 10 (date unknown) (unpublished manuscript, on file in the Tugwall Papers, 38. in the
Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, New York) (on file with Author) [hereinafter Tug%%all,
The Spring of Thirty-Two].
54. See TUGWELL, INDUSTRIAL DISCIPLINE, supranote 53, at 203-07.
55. See id.
56. See id.
57. See id.
58. See Adolf A. Berle & Louis Faulkner, The Nature of the Diffliculty (1932), in NAVIGa.TING
THE RAPIDS, 1918-1971: FROM THE PAPERS OF ADOLF A. BERLE 32 (Beatrice Bishop Bede &
Travis Beal Jacobs eds., 1973) [hereinafter The Nature ofthe DIfficulty].

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2001

7

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 29, Iss. 4 [2001], Art. 2
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 29:1015

economic crisis and suggested possible remedies. 9 Berle believed the
key to the situation was the public's loss of its sense of security.'
Because individuals no longer felt secure in their savings and livelihood,
they sought to reduce all of their assets to cash. 6' The logical result was
the hoarding of cash and the economic crisis. 2 The remedy, Berle
believed, was to restore individual security so that lending, investing and
purchasing would resume. 3 This could be done, he proposed, through
various guarantees for interest payments, and indirect employment
guarantees.6
Beyond addressing the current economic crisis, Berle's
memorandum urged FDR to take the "long view." 5 As a preface to this
discussion, Berle said that concentration in the United States economy
was growing so quickly that, "[a]t the present rate of trend," within
twenty years, it would look very much like the Soviet economy in
Russia. 66 "There is no great difference between having all industry run
by a committee of Commissars and by a small group of Directors.""
With that in mind, financial reform was needed, particularly for firms
large and concentrated enough to list their shares on a stock exchange."
Berle proposed two reforms relevant to this Article. First, that
publicity should be given to corporate accounts and stock transactions. 9
Berle later described this as the "[b]eginnings of [s]ecurities [and]
[e]xchange legislation."'7 But in fact, mandatory disclosure schemes had
been an important part of the traditional Progressive canon." Berle's
second proposal, on the other hand, went well beyond orthodoxy.
Investment bankers, Berle said, had acted irresponsibly by
considering the sale of securities to be their sole concern." By holding to
the position that they were only merchants of securities, selling to the
public what the public wanted at the moment, they placed the economic
59. See id.
60. See id. at 33.
61. See id.
62. See id. at 33-34.
63. See id. at 33.
64. See id. at 37.
65. Id. at 45.
66. Id. at 45-46.
67. Id. at 46.
68. See id.
69. See id.
70. Id. (including in the published text Berle's historical notations that, in his view, this was
the beginning of the securities and exchange legislation).
71. See MICHAEL E. PARRISH, SECURmES REGULATION AND THE NEw DEAL 5-20 (1970)
(discussing the Progressive fervor in early state and federal disclosure schemes).
72. See The Natureof the Difficulty, supranote 58, at 46.
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system of the country at the hazard of "tremendous issues of securities
many of which [were] unsound; some of which [were] sound but issued
at inflated values; and some of which [were] sound but uneconomically
distributed."' Therefore, Berle concluded:
[it] seem[ed] necessary that there should be constituted a Capital Issues
Board which could perform the functions of a federal Blue Sky
Commission, exacting full information about securities sold .... Such
a commission could be gradually developed to the point where it
would exercise a real control over undue expansion of groups of credit
instruments, where issue of these reached a point threatening the safety
of the financial structure. 74
Berle did not explain what he meant by real control over undue
expansion of groups of credit instruments.5 Nonetheless, from the text
of his memorandum, we can infer that he intended the Board to control
the soundness, value and distribution of securities. If exercised, these
powers would have given the Board decisive control over the core
functions of the securities industry. It also would have been a major step
toward Tugwell's proposal to have 6 the federal government allocate
capital among, and within, industries.
FDR adopted these proposals for which there is some ambiguous
archival support.71 More importantly, the candidate gave a major speech,
delivered on May 22, 1932, at Oglethorpe University, in which he
described the Brains Trust's ideas as his own. 7'
In the Oglethorpe Speech, FDR stated that "[tihe country
needs[,] ... the country demands bold, persistent experimentation.""
The type of experimentation he had in mind was outlined in the text. The
economy, FDR said, was characterized by chaos, lack of plan, and great
waste.F' Turning specifically to the history of America's industrial

73. Id.
74. Id. at 47 (omitting Berle's later notations).
75. See id.
76. See infra text accompanying notes 91-96.
77. The memorandum is annotated with: "Discussed in Albany with Gov. Roosevelt." and
others, including Moley and Tugwell. "in May 1932, generally adopted." Adolf Berle. The Nature
of the Difficulty I (May 1932) (unpublished manuscript, on file in the Berle Papers, 18. in the
Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, New York) (on file with Author).
78. See Franklin D. Roosevelt, "The Country Needs, the Country Demands Bold. Persistent
Experimentation," Address at Oglethorpe University (May 2., 1932). in I TIIE PLBtUC PAPWrS AND
ADDRESSES OFFRANKLtN D. ROOSEVELT 639 (Samuel L Rosenman ed., 1938) [hereinafter P-BUic
PAPERS].

79. Id. at 646.
80. See id. at 641.
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development, he highlighted its haphazardness and gigantic waste."'
There had been "superfluous duplication of productive facilities, the
continual scrapping of still useful equipment, the tremendous mortality
in industrial and commercial undertakings, the thousands of dead-end
trails into which enterprise ha[d] been lured, [and] the profligate waste
of natural resources. 82 The misdirection of capital or credit played an
important role in this chaos, because it had "been devoted to unjustified
enterprises[,] to the development of unessentials and to the multiplying
of many products far beyond the capacity of the Nation to absorb."83
"Much of this," FDR said, "could have been prevented by greater
foresight and by a larger measure of social planning." Such little
control as had been exercised, he said, was by a "small group of men
whose chief outlook upon the social welfare is tinctured by the fact that
they can make huge profits from the lending of money and the marketing
of securities. ' ' .5 "[I]n the long run," FDR reasoned, the most important
problem was that of "controlling by adequate planning the creation and
distribution of those
products which our vast economic machine is
'8 6
capable of yielding.
While the Oglethorpe Speech had not been written by the Brains
Trust, 7 they had no objection to its message.8 Its call for social
planning, and its attack on the outlook of the "small group of men"
making huge profits from the lending of money and selling of securities
was fully consistent with the advice in Berle's memorandum. 9 Tugwell
thought the speech was "a remarkably suitable beginning for the
campaign to come."'
After Roosevelt received the Democratic Party's nomination in
July, the Brains Trust followed up on the Oglethorpe proposals. Tugwell
gave the candidate a memorandum recommending the formation of a
Federal Economic Council. 9' Tugwell proposed that experts would gauge
in advance the average of demand in the economy and then prepare
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

Seeid. at642.
Id.
Id. at 644.
Id. at 642.
Id.
Id. at 644.
Its author was Ernest Lindley, a journalist assigned to the Roosevelt campaign. See
TUGWELL, BRAINS TRUST, supra note 39, at 103-04.
88. See id. at 126.
89. See Roosevelt, supra note 78, at 642.
90. TUGWELL, BRAINS TRUST, supra note 39, at 126.
91. See R.G. Tugwell, Proposal for an Economic Council, in TUGWELL, BRAINS TRUST,
supra note 39, app. at 526.
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coordinated production programs so that "the amount of the goods
flowing into the markets" would be proportional to consumers'
purchasing power.9 The Council would accomplish this by, among other
methods, encouraging or discouraging the flow of capital into various
industries. 9 Tugwell further proposed that the Council should have a
Capital Issues Division to focus on this task. At least initially, the
Council would operate through "reasoned planning and expert
persuasion." 95 Eventually, TugweU noted, "[ift might be necessary ...to
implement ' its powers by constitutional change and enabling
legislation." "
Berle also gave the candidate a memorandum on this topic' Berle
said that "[t]he liberal wing of the [Democratic] [P]arty, particularly the
intellectuals, [was] very firm in favor of an economic council.""3 He
continued, "[i]n theory, of course, they [were] right. ' "' In his view, the
industrial situation could lead to only one of two outcomes. "Either the
government [would] stepo1 in through some form of economic
administration; or the business machinery, by consolidation, merger, or
the like, [would] evolve] an irresponsible economic government of its
own."' ' Moreover, like Tugwell, Berle urged a slow development for the
Council, with its authority to grow only as the wisdom of its judgment
gathered public confidence.' ° '
The proposal for a Capital Issues Board/Federal Economic Council
suggests one of those stark alternative histories that are most visible in
times of crisis. It is tempting to imagine how different American history
would have been if the proposal had been adopted. But no one can
predict where it would have led. To do so requires so many speculative
assumptions that the exercise is worthless. Even to suggest some of the
possible outcomes for the securities industry-nationalization, various
forms of government guidance for a putatively independent industry, or
chaos and reaction-demonstrates how many different scenarios could
have played out. Tugwell's suggestion that implementation may have

92. IhL
app. at 525-26.
93. See id. app. at 526.
94. See id.
95. Id. app. at 527.
96. Id.
97. See Memorandum from Adolf A. Bede, to Governor Franklin D. Roosevelt jAug. 17,
1932), in NAVIGATING THE RAPIDS, supra note 58,at 59.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id
101. See id.
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required changes to the Constitution illustrates both the proposal's
scope, and the limitations inherent in any effort to predict its specific
outcome.' ° Nonetheless, it is safe to conclude that development of the
peacetime securities industry would have gone off on a radically
different path than the one it has actually taken. After the Oglethorpe
Speech, it is also evident that this type of thinking was part of the
ascendancy within the Roosevelt campaign.
2. The Candidate Turns to People of Character
On August 4, 1932, ten and one-half weeks after the Oglethorpe
Speech, FDR dramatically changed his campaign's policy direction."
Because of this change, the eventual regulatory regime for the securities
industry would bear no resemblance to the Brains Trust's Capital Issues
Board/Federal Economic Council.
Almost as soon as the Oglethorpe Speech had been given, Tugwell
had an inkling that its policies were in trouble.'0 4 One evening after FDR
had returned from the Oglethorpe trip, when he and Tugwell happened
to be alone, the discussion turned to the speech.' 3 Tugwell hoped that
industrial planning and coordination would be one of the important
themes of the campaign.'06 FDR, however, seemed hesitant.' °7 He said
that his principal political adviser had had "a fit and had claimed that the
politicians were all scared."' ' Tugwell recognized that FDR was moving
back to orthodox views.' 9
In the following weeks, had it been fully informed, the Brains Trust
would have been even more concerned. As the Democratic Party
Platform was being drafted and adopted, Tugwell believed FDR neither
knew nor cared what it said." In fact, Huston Thompson, author of the
plank on securities regulation, kept FDR informed of his work."' In
early July, Thompson reported that he had headed off a plank calling for

102. See supra text accompanying note 96.
103. See infra text accompanying notes 189-98.
104. See TUGWELL, BRAINS TRUST, supra note 39, at 27 1.
105. See id. at 167-69.
106. See id. at 168.
107. See id.
108. Id. at 169.
109. See id.
110. See id. at 195,261.
111. See Letter from Huston Thompson, to Hon. Franklin D. Roosevelt I (June 11, 1932)
(unpublished letter available in the Papers of Huston Thompson, Box 3, in the Library of Congress)
(on file with Author) (describing work on platform).
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"[c]ontrol of the [slale of [s]ecurities."' " The plank written by
Thompson called for disclosure and stock exchange regulation."' At the

end of July, FDR told Thompson
that he thought the final securities
' 4
plank was "a very fine one."

While the Brains Trust appears to have been unaware of the
maneuvering around the securities plank, they were very much cognizant
of the fact that the Oglethorpe Speech would infuriate Justice Louis D.

Brandeis."5 Brandeis was an orthodox progressive. Indeed, as Tugwell
put it, he was the "high priest of the orthodox sanctuary.""' Brandeis had

been an influential adviser to President Woodrow Wilson", who had
appointed him to the Supreme Court in 1916."' The Brains Trust did not
suspect Brandeis' anger because they believed he supported the status

quo. Almost twenty years before, in Other People's Money,"' Brandeis
had launched his own withering attack on the securities industry's
leading firms."o
In the years before he joined the Supreme Court, Brandeis had

widely publicized his economic views. The crucial actor in the economy,
Brandeis believed, was the individual with judgment and leadership. The

success or failure of an enterprise, he said, depended '"usually upon one
man; upon the quality of one man's judgment, and, above all things, his
others.""'
capacity to see what is needed and his capacity to direct

Moreover, he said, "'there is a limit to what one [person] can do
well.'"" As an organization grows, the person at its head '"has a
diminishing knowledge of the [operative] facts"' and "'a diminishing

112. Letter from Huston Thompson, to Hon. Franklin D. Roosevelt 1 I.July
7. 19321
(unpublished letter available in the Papers of Huston Thompson. Box 3. in the Library of Congress)
(on file with Author).
113. See generally Franklin D. Roosevelt, "IPledge You-I Pledge My eIfto a Ne,1
D-al for
the American People' The Governor Accepts the Nomination for the Presidency, Chicago, Ill. Ju
2, 1932), in 1 PUBLIC PAPERS, supra note 78. at 647, 667.
114. Letter from Hon. Franklin D. Roosevelt, to Huston Thompson I (Jul 30, 19321
(unpublished letter available in the Papers of Huston Thompson. Box 2. in the Library of Congress
(on file with Author).
115. See TLG ELL, BRAINS TRUST, supra note 39. at 145.
116. Tugwell, The Spring of Thirty-Two, supra note 53, at 16.
117. See ALPHEUS THOmAS MASON, BRANDEIS: A FREE Mt 'S LIFE 375-403 (194W.
118. See id. at 465. For a discussion of the bitter political battle over Brandeis' nomination al
confirmation, see id. at 465-508.
119. Louis D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY: AND HOW THE B s cERlS USE IT f1933
ed.).
120. See id. at 1-34.
121. MASON, supra note 117, at 354 (quoting Brandeis' testimony before the Seznae
Committee on Interstate Commerce in August 1911).
122. Id. (quoting Brandeis' testimony).
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opportunity [for] exercising a careful judgment upon them.""' Thus, in
Brandeis' view, the bigness praised by many contemporaries, including
the Brains Trust, would actually saddle the economy with increasing
inefficiency as it overwhelmed the individual businessperson's capacity
for informed judgment about his or her enterprise. 2 4
Brandeis' emphasis on individual judgment carried over into his
analysis of the securities industry. In Other People's Money, Brandeis
called the banker an expert with special knowledge and judgment.' As
such, a banker should act with detachment and freedom from conflicts of
interest, just as a lawyer should not be his or her own client.'2 6 As
Brandeis saw it, this detachment served two purposes. First, when
exercising his or her proper functions of granting or withholding credit,
and purchasing, refusing to purchase, or selling securities, the banker
"pass[es] judgment on the efficiency of [an issuer's] management or the
soundness of the enterprise."' 27 Only detachment, that is freedom from
conflicts of interest, allows the banker to have the clearest professional
judgment in those tasks.'2 Second, the banker stands before a large part
of his or her customers "in a position of trust, which should be fully
recognized.' 29 Brandeis believed that such clients need and are entitled
to have the banker's unbiased advice.'3°
Brandeis summed up his ideas in his 1914 work, Business-A
Profession.3 ' In it, he said that business, including the business of
finance, was ready to join law, medicine, and theology among the
professions. 3 2 He also defined what he meant by a profession. First, he
said, "[a] profession is an occupation for which the necessary
123. Id. at 354-55 (quoting Brandeis' testimony).
124. Brandeis also believed that these inefficiencies of size would arise even when
organizations were not monopolies. See id. at 202.
125. See BRANDEIS, supranote 119, at 5-6.
126. See id. at 135-36.
127. Id. at 135.
128. See id. at 134-36. Brandeis' ideas on banker independence were part of a larger analysis.
He believed that the conflicts of interest created by bankers taking an active role in management, or
by directors serving on multiple boards, were inefficient because they interfered with sound
judgment, and dangerous, because they allowed despotic concentrations of economic power. See
MASON, supra note 117, at 415. In regards to the latter, Brandeis compared J.P. Morgan to Caesar
Augustus, because both aggregated great power through the "long-concealed concentration of
distinct functions, which are beneficent when separately administered, and dangerous only when
combined in the same persons." BRANDEIS, supranote 119, at 4.
129. BRANDEIS, supranote 119, at 136.
130. See id.
131. Louis D. BRANDEIS, BUSINESs-A PROFESSION (Hale, Cushman & Flint 1933) (1914).
132. See id. at 1 (citing also to manufacturing, merchandising, and transportation as "new
professions").
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preliminary training is intellectual in character, involving knowledge and
to some extent learning, as distinguished from mere skill."'" Second,
"[i]t is an occupation which is pursued largely for others and not merely
for one's self.' 3' MThird, "[i]t is an occupation in which the amount of
financial return is not the accepted measure of success.""' Brandeis
believed that the business community was ready to work by these
standards. As he put it, "[i]n the field of modem business, so rich in
opportunity for the exercise of man's finest and most varied mental
faculties and moral qualities, mere money-making cannot be regarded as
the legitimate end."'3 Moreover, he concluded, professionalized
business enjoyed an advantage that distinguished it from "petty
trafficking or mere money-making," and answered "the narrow moneymaker without either vision or ideals ... even on his own low plane of

material success."'37 In short, when its work was "worthily pursued," the
business of finance would be a profession.'"
Brandeis' image of the business of finance as a profession whose
members should act with detachment, in a relationship of trust with
individual clients, and with freedom from conflicts of interest, was
hardly consistent with the Brains Trust's goal of bringing it under the
control of a federal planning agency. The Brains Trusters were right to
fear his fury. Moreover, infuriating Brandeis was particularly dangerous,
because the Brains Trust recognized that he was one of the leading
influences on FDR's development.' 9 Moley predicted that Felix
Frankfurter, Brandeis' emissary to the world outside the Supreme
Court,'4 0 would pay a call to Albany before the dust had settled.'"' He
was right.
Brandeis appears to have kept in touch with developments during
the 1932 political season. He had many consultations with Thompson on
the securities plank of the Democratic Party platform." He also wrote
133. Id. at 2.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. 1& at 4-5.
137. IiL at 12.
138. Id. at 2.
139. See Tugwell, The Spring of Thirty-Twvo, supra note 53, at 16-17 tstating that "the one real
rival of Brandeis for the father role in Franklin's life vms Theodore Roosevelt").
140. See generally BRUCE ALLEN MURPHY, THE BRANDELSIFRANKFRTRTER CoNNECTIOrN: THE
SECRETPOLITICAL ACIVITIES OF TWO SUPREME COURTJUSTICES 33 (1982) (positing that once on
the Supreme Court, Brandeis could no longer play a public role in the issues of the day. so he uJd
Frankfurter as a messenger and proxy).
141. See TUGxWELL, BRAINS TRUST, supra note 39, at 145.
142. See Letter from Huston Thompson, to Hon. Franklin D. Roosevelt, supra note 112.
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Frankfurter, on the day Roosevelt accepted the Party's nomination, that

"Roosevelt's nomination is a comfort."''

3

A few days later, FDR and

Frankfurter spoke on the phone, and the candidate suggested that

Frankfurter should obtain a copy of the memorandum on "things
economic" prepared by the Brains Trust.'

Frankfurter began to gather

information on the campaign"14 and then met with the candidate in
person.
At some point before the evening of August 4, 1932, Frankfurter sat
down with Roosevelt in Albany to discuss the campaign.'46 Their
conversation covered a number of topics. Frankfurter suggested various
people who, as informed Washingtonians, could supplement Moley,
Tugwell, and Berle. 47 Specifically, he urged Roosevelt to add Max
Lowenthal to his campaign staff. 4 1 On substantive issues, Frankfurter
raised various topics, and then listened to FDR's views and took notes.',
These topics included railroads, utilities, holding companies, agriculture,
and others.5 Finally, while Frankfurter did not expressly raise the topic

of the securities industry, he did caution Roosevelt as to his "affirmative
policies," at least as to the importance of "language."''

143. Letter from Louis D. Brandeis, to Felix Frankfurter (July 2, 1932), microfornied on Felix
Frankfurter Papers, Reel 16, Frame 797.
144. See Memorandum from Felix Frankfurter, to Governor Roosevelt (July 5, 1932),
microfornzed on Felix Frankfurter Papers, Reel 60, Frames 32-33.
145. See Letter from Felix Frankfurter, to Hon. Samuel I. Rosenman (July 11, 1932),
microformed on Felix Frankfurter Papers, Reel 105, Frame 572; Letter from Felix Frankfurter to
Francis Perkins (July 18, 1932), microformed on Felix Frankfurter Papers, Reel 105, Frame 573;
Letter from Felix Frankfurter to Molly Dewson (July 18, 1932) (unpublished letter available in the
Personal and Private Files, Number 5689, in the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, New
York) (on file with Author).
146. The meeting's date is uncertain. However, it is safe to say that it took place before the
evening of August 4th, even though Frankfurter's letter to Brandeis describing it is dated August
7th. See Letter from Felix Frankfurter, to Louis D. Brandeis (Aug. 7, 1932), microfortned on L.D.
Brandeis Papers, Louisville, Box G-9, Reel 65 (frames are unnumbered, the letter is captioned
"Aug. 7" and will be found in "Government (G.9-2) Correspondence with Mr. Felix Frankfurter")
(note that this letter is placed out of sequence on the microfilm reel, and will be found among
correspondence of a later date). Frankfurter urged Roosevelt to add Max Lowenthal to his campaign
policy staff, and Lowenthal appeared for a meeting with the candidate on the evening of August 4th.
This chronology is also consistent with other evidence. See Letter from Felix Frankfurter, to Hon.
Franklin D. Roosevelt (Aug. 5, 1932) (unpublished letter available in Papers as Governor, Series 1,
Box 29, in the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, New York) (on file with Author)
(discussing Frankfurter's thoughts since leaving Albany on a particular political issue).
147. See Letter from Felix Frankfurter, to Louis D. Brandeis, supranote 146.
148. See id.
149. See id.
150. See id.
151. Id. (quoting Frankfurter's letter to Brandeis stating that "[a]s to affirmative policies
cautioned him as to the importance of [his] language").
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Was this enough to turn Roosevelt away from the Brains Trust?
The candidate surely would have listened carefully to any words of
caution from Frankfurter, who was his friend,'" an adviser, "' and
Brandeis' emissary."4 In any event, when FDR abandoned control and
planning, the Brains Trust blamed Frankfurter. Tugwell reported that
"when the turn came," Moley cursed Frankfurter as its "chief architect,"
but Tugwell continued, "probably not within the candidate's hearing."'"
In the weeks after the Democratic Convention, Brandeis and
Frankfurter were not the only outsiders challenging the Brains Trust's
influence over the candidate. Businesspeople also approached Roosevelt,
and they had the added advantage that with their policy ideas came
significant campaign contributions. As Tugwell put it, the "speculators,"
Bernard Baruch and Joseph Kennedy, were the most generous and the
most demanding. 1 6 For the moment, Baruch played the more important
role.
Baruch was a financier, or as people in Washington put it, a "'Wall
Street gambler. ' "" He was a "staunch Democrat.""' Like Brandeis, he
had played an important role in the Wilson administration." Most
prominently, during World War I, he had led the nation's program of
economic mobilization.'o In 1932, once FDR carried the convention,
Baruch offered his services."' This included extensive financial
support-as General Hugh Johnson, Baruch's associate, put it, any time
there was a financial crisis in the campaign,
Baruch "either gave the
6
it."'1
got
and
out
went
or
money,
necessary
Like Brandeis, Baruch approached the campaign with a developed
body of policy ideas. Baruch believed that "'[a]ll economic movements,
by their very nature, are motivated by crowd psychology. '"1 3 Drawing
on Charles Mackay's Extraordinarv Popular Delusions and the
152. See FELiX FRANKFURTER Re mNScES 236-37 (Harlan B. Phillips ed., 1960) (illustrating
how FDR and Frankfurter had become friends while working in Washington during World War I).

153. See id. at 237 (showing how while FDR was Governor of New York, Frankfurter hbd
advised him on various topics).

154. See supratext accompanying note 140.
155. Tugwell, The Spring of Thirty-Two. supra note 53.at 18.

156. See TUGWELL, BRAINS TRUST, supra note 39, at 152.
157.

HUGH S.JOHNSON, THE BLUE EAGLE FROM EGG TO F-ARTH 113 (1935).

158. BERNARD M. BARUCH, BARUCH: THE PuBLc YEARS 171 (1960).
159. See JORDAN A. SCHWARz, THE SPECULATOR: BERNARD M. BARIVCH IN WA ltGTO',
1917-1965, at 45-49 (1981).

160. See generally id. at 50-108 (discussing Baruch's leadership in the War Industries Boardl.
161. See BARUCH, supra note 158, at 241.
162. JOHNSON, supranote 157, at 141.
163. BARUCH, supranote 158, at 228 (quoting his owvn writings).
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Madness of Crowds,'6' Baruch believed that no one was immune to
crowd madness.'65 Rank, education, graphs, business ratios, the
mathematics of price movements, even the condition of the normal
trend; all could be swept aside by these mass eruptions.' 6 Applying these
ideas to current conditions, Baruch believed that the "market madness of
1927 to 1929" had been such an event.167 Moreover, after the crash,
unreasoning pessimism had replaced unreasoning optimism.' 6 The
fundamental cause of the economic crisis of the early 1930s, Baruch
believed, was the corroding fear that gripped the land. 6 9
Baruch's policy ideas were based on this analysis. Most
importantly, he believed, the psychology of confidence had to be
restored. Johnson stated this proposition eloquently in a draft speech
written for possible use at the Democratic Convention: "There is nothing
the matter with America .... Here, then, are all the elements of an
active business and a moderate prosperity-save one-confidence is
gone. The present stagnation is a malign spell without economic rhyme
or reason. The name of that spell is fear.""'7 As Tugwell summed it up,
Baruch believed in "the simple thesis that the [economic crisis] would
end when businessmen got back their confidence."''
Baruch proposed a number of specific policies that he believed
would restore confidence. Most were fairly conventional. On the eve of
the Democratic Convention he urged drastic reductions in federal
spending and a balanced budget. 7 2 He also believed that sacrifices
should be made for "frugality and revenue.""' These ideas would have a
place in the presidential campaign, and would add to the eclectic mix of
policies that FDR pursued in his first administration. With respect to
planning, however, Baruch's policy ideas were less conventional.
Baruch believed that some level of planning was needed to
rationalize the industrial economy. Indeed, biographer Jordan A.
Schwarz has concluded that Baruch's "principal public purpose" was "to
educate the American people to accept planning for economic
164. CHARLES MACKAY, EXTRAORDINARY POPULAR DELUSIONS AND THE MADNESS OF
CROWDS (1932) (discussing, among other things, John Law's Mississippi Scheme, the South-Sea
Bubble, and the Tulipomania).
165. See BARUCH, supra note 158, at 227-29.
166, See id. at228.
167. See id. at 229.
168. Seeid. at231.
169. See id.
170. JOHNSON, supra note 157, at 140.
171. TUGWELL, DEMOCRATIC ROOSEVELT, supra note 40, at 239.
172. See Billion Budget Cut Asked by Baruch,N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 1932, at 13.
173. BARUCH, supra note 158, at 244.
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stabilization."'74 Moreover, Baruch had a specific type of planning in
mind. He advocated business exercising "'group self-government." ' "' In
a speech given in 1930, he said, "'[v]hat business needs ... is a
common forum where problems requiring cooperation can be
considered, and acted upon with the constructive, non-political sanction
of government." 76 In his 1930 speech, Baruch referred to this forum as
a "'supreme court of business."" "'Its deliberations,"' he said, "'should
be wholly scientific,
briefed like an engineer's report and published to
78
world."
the
While the Brains Trust was certain of Brandeis' antipathy, they
were less certain of Baruch's thinking. His support for planning could
indicate a point of agreement. However, any such agreement would have
been very superficial. Baruch was no enemy of planning, but he was no
friend of the Brains Trust's goal of bringing the economy under the
control of a federal planning agency. Baruch was most explicit in his
criticism of such ideas. He did not want, he said, some "'repressive,
inquisitorial, mediocre bureau, ' ' 79 and he strongly opposed setting up
any body for economic planning.""~ Indeed, he was ready to characterize
such a body as "dictatorial."'' Hence, despite his support for planning,
Baruch appeared to the Brains Trust as someone who, like "most eastern
business men. ...want[ed] to permit free play to business."'"

Baruch's approach to the campaign followed much the same pattern
as that of the Brandeis-Frankfurter camp. Like Frankfurter, he visited the
candidate and discussed his views.' Also like Frankfurter, he placed a
representative on the candidate's policy staff, in this case, his associate
Johnson.'" Tugwell thought Johnson was an orthodox business-minded
addition to their group.""
Did Baruch turn Roosevelt away from the Brains Trust? At least
some members of the Brains Trust were worried. Tugvell wrote that
174. ScH-vIRz, supra note 159, at 6.
175. BaruchProposes 'Court of Business'. N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 1930. at 12 (quoting Baruehl.
176. Id. (quoting Baruch).
177. Id. (quoting Baruch).
178. Id. (quoting Baruch).
179. Id. (quoting Baruch).
180. See Baruch Sees Nation Rising From Slump, N.Y. TLIES, Nov. 12,1931, at 1.
181. Id. at 16.
182. Memorandum from Adolf A. Bere, to Governor Franklin D. Roosevelt (July 20, 1932}. in
NAVIGATING THE RAPIDS, supranote 58, at 51.
183. See BARUCH, supra note 158, at 242-45.
184. See MoLEY, AFTER SEVEN YEARS, supranote 48.at 39.
185. See Rexford G. Tugwell, The ProgressiveOrthodo., of Franklin D. Roosevelt, 64 EThICS
1,22 (1953).
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within a week of the convention he was already concerned that Baruch
was controlling the candidate.1 6 When he mentioned his concern to
Senator Bob La Follette, the Senator replied, "'Oh no, ... not that
"confidence" stuff again!""" However, it is unclear how much influence
Baruch actually had over Roosevelt. Moley at least''believed that FDR
treated him with "reticence" and "semi-detachment. 8
With his principal political adviser having a fit, the Democratic
Party Platform substituting disclosure and exchange regulation for
control over the sale of securities, Brandeis sending words of caution,
and one of his principal financial backers advocating a different
approach, FDR must have felt tremendous pressure to turn away from
the Brains Trust. On the evening of August 4, 1932, he turned. A
meeting was held in Albany to discuss upcoming campaign speeches.'
All of the major figures involved in formulating the campaign's policy
positions were represented, or attended in person. Johnson represented
Baruch, and Lowenthal appeared at Frankfurter's instigation.'o Moley,
Tugwell and Berle were there.'
Finally, two personal advisers
accompanied Governor Roosevelt."" They decided that a speech on
stock market publicity should come first, probably within two weeks.'9"
The time had come for the candidate to finalize the campaign's policy
message on the securities industry.
At the present time, FDR believed that the government could not
"undertake to tell people in what they shall or shall not invest."' 4 He did
feel, however, that the government could do four things: "(a) Make sure
that only men of character undertake the flotation of securities, and (b)
That all material facts in regard to those securities are known; and (c)
That there shall be continuously public accounts; and (d) That
manipulative moves by the corporate insiders ought to be disclosed. '"93
The candidate had chosen-in two words-character and disclosure.

186. See TUGWELL, BRAINS TRUST, supranote 39, at 271.
187. Id. (quoting La Follette and suggesting that an emphasis on confidence was the policy of
the incumbent Hoover administration).
188. MOLEY, FIRST NEW DEAL, supranote 51, at 389.
189. See Memorandum of Adolf A. Berle (Aug. 5, 1932), in NAVIGATING THE RAPIDS, supra
note 58, at 53.
190. See id. Moley objected to Lowenthal's participation, but was overruled. See id.
191. See id.
192. See id. at 53, 55 (identifying Samuel Rosenman and Basil ("Doe") O'Connor as the two
advisers).
193. See id. at 54.
194. Id. at 55.
195. Id.
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The August 4th meeting in Albany changed the course of federal
securities regulation. The regulatory regime would be based on character
and disclosure, not on a Capital Issues Board/Federal Economic Council.
Among contemporaries, Tugwell at least recognized what was
happening. The Brains Trust was losing the struggle for FDR's mind.""
For years afterwards, Tugwell "reproached" himself for his failure to

protest.'97 He also continued to believe that the Oglethorpe Speech
represented FDR's real convictions. S' Nonetheless, the decision had
been made. The Brains Trust's proposals would not shape the future
regulatory regime.
B. Final Vision: Honesty, Honor,the Sacrednessof Obligation,
Faithful Protection,and Unselfish Performance

Once FDR had settled on character and disclosure as the bases for
his securities policy, these concepts appeared prominently in his
speeches. Two addresses in particular articulated this new vision.

In Columbus, Ohio, on August 20, 1932, FDR gave the speech that
had been discussed at the Albany meeting.!" It focused on disclosure.
His policy, FDR said, was based on telling the truth. 0 "Government,"
he said, "cannot prevent [people] from making errors of judgment. But
Government can prevent ... the fooling of sensible people through

misstatements and through the withholding of information on the part of
private organizations, great and small, which seek to sell investments to
the people of the Nation." : ' While Tugwell was opposed to the speechr
Johnson liked it' and it expressed Brandeis' views. Just as the

196. See TUGNELL, BRAINS TRUST. supra note 39, at 403 (stating that "[Jilt is pirhps
overblown to speak of a struggle for his mind. Still, that is how we spoke of it then"). Berle may
not have recognized the importance of the August 4th meeting because he %,%as
still gising the
candidate advice on the Federal Economic Council almost tvo %yeekslater. See Memorandum from
Adolf A- Berle, to Governor Franklin D. Roosevelt (Aug. 17, 1932), in NAVIG ,%TINThE Ri rDs.
supra note 58, at 59.
197. See TUGWELL, BRAINS TRUST, supra note 39, at 473.
198. See TUGWELL, DF IoCRATic ROOSEVELT, supra note 40. at 219.
199. See Franklin D. Roosevelt, The Failures of the Preceding Administration, Campaign
Address at Columbus, Ohio (Aug. 20, 1932). in 1 PUBUC PAP-RS. supra note 78, at 669, 63 2.
200. See id.
201. Id.
202. See Tugwell, supra note 185, at 16.
203. See id.
204. See id.
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Oglethorpe Speech had publicly marked the Brains Trust's ascendancy,
the Columbus Speech publicly marked its fall. 20 5
The Columbus Speech marked the change in FDR's policy, but his
first Inaugural Address is the fullest expression of the moral purpose he
had selected. The Address began with the now famous proclamation that
"the only thing we have to fear is fear itself."' ' It then went on to focus
on the ethics of Wall Street, or as the Address described them, the
"[p]ractices of the unscrupulous money changers.,,M
The
"moneychangers," FDR said, "stand indicted in the court of public
opinion, rejected by the hearts and minds of men."2 3 They know "only
the rules of a generation of self-seekers. They have no vision, and when
there is no vision the people perish." 2 "The moneychangers," he
continued, "have fled from their high seats in the temple of our
civilization."21 "We may now," FDR continued, "restore that temple to
the ancient truths. '2 '
The ancient truths he had in mind were revealed in the next several
passages. First, "[the joy and moral stimulation of work no longer must
be forgotten in the mad chase of evanescent profits."2 2 Instead of
monetary profit, "more noble" social values should be the standard of
success.2"3 Second, he called for an end to conduct in banking and
business that, as he put it, has too often given to a "sacred trust the
likeness of callous and selfish wrongdoing. 2 4 Third, he said, "[s]mall
wonder that confidence languishes, for it thrives only on honesty, on
honor, on the sacredness of obligations, on faithful protection, on
unselfish performance; without them it cannot live."2 '
The above passages from the Inaugural Address plainly reveal
Brandeis' influence. Like Brandeis, the President described banking and

205. In the weeks following the Columbus speech, Brandeis expressed his approval. See Letter
from Louis D. Brandeis, to Felix Frankfurter (Aug. 25, 1932), inicroformed on Felix Frankfurter
Papers, Reel 16, Frame 808 (stating that FDR "gained much" through the Columbus speech),
Baruch publicly announced his support for FDR's candidacy. See Bartich Acclains Roosevelt as
Soumd, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 6, 1932, at I (deriding talk of FDR's supposed radicalism).
206. Franklin D. Roosevelt, Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1933), in 2 PUBLIC PAPERS, supra note
78, at 11.
207. Id. at 12.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. See id.
214. Id.
215. Id.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol29/iss4/2

22

Walsh: A Simple Code of Ethics: A History of the Moral Purpose Inspiring
20011

A SIMPLE CODE OF ETHICS

business as in the nature of a trust.2 16 In addition, his call for a restoration
of the joy and moral stimulation of work, and for a standard of success
more noble than monetary profit could have been based directly on
Business-A Profession.'7 It is interesting that Moley, in his first rough
sketches of the address, gave this passage a much more radical tone by
saying "it behooves us to restore moral values by driving out-material
standards.'2's The Address's final phraseology, which transforms the
message from the language of forceful change to the language of ethical
and professional restoration, is illustrative of the whole campaign.
Baruch's influence can also be seen.2 9 The psychology of
confidence and fear was prominently featured. The passage on having
"nothing to fear but fear itself" could have been based directly on the
draft speech Baruch and Johnson had taken to the Democratic
Convention. In Roosevelt's hands, however, this idea took on new
meaning. The failure of confidence was caused by an ethical failure. -' 3In
essence, FDR synthesized Baruch's ideas on confidence and Brandeis'
ideas on professional duty into a policy vision that included, and
transcended, both. He identified the problem as fear and a crippling loss
of confidence. He also identified the cause of the problem as bankers
and businesspersons' callous wrongdoing and breach of sacred trust."'
Finally, he identified the remedy. Confidence would flourish when
business was conducted with honesty, honor, sacred obligation, faithful
protection and unselfish performance.-"
FDR's first Inaugural Address set out the basic direction for the
new administration's policy toward the securities industry. Instead of
planning the allocation of capital to avoid waste, it would seek to revive
confidence by restoring securities professionals' moral character. The
ideas of Brandeis and Baruch would animate the federal regulation of
the securities industry.
C. A Sinple Code of Ethics

As the Roosevelt administration took office, the time had come to
turn both campaign and inauguration rhetoric into the more prosaic
language of law and regulation. Securities legislation was a "must" of
216. See supratext accompanying note 129.
217. See BRANDEIs, supranote 131, at 2.
218. MOLEY, FRsT NEV DEAL, supranote 51. at 107.

219. See supratext accompanying notes 183-98.
220. See Roosevelt, supra note 206, at 12.
221. See id.
222. See id.
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"the first order" for the new administration. 22' The President decided to
go forward with a disclosure bill, while temporarily deferring a bill for
stock exchange regulation.224 While the administration's efforts would be
focused on disclosure, in his first weeks in office, FDR would make two
specific proposals demonstrating the types of regulations he had in mind
for the other, character-based component of his policy.
The first proposal was made in a statement about the disclosure bill.
The new President took a personal interest in the disclosure bill.22'
Huston Thompson, author of the Democratic Party's securities plank,
226FDR met with Thompson twice, went over the
was recruited to draft it.
draft bill, and made specific suggestions.227 He criticized the bill's length
and detail, and suggested that Thompson cut down both. 228 Thompson
later told the President that he had reduced the bill's length as much as
possible, 229 but FDR was still not satisfied. When he sent the bill to
Congress, FDR told the press that he had "tried to cut it down but found
it impossible." 2' In addition, when the press asked whether the
disclosure bill completed his program, FDR responded:
[T]he big objective is to restore the old idea that a person who uses
other people's money is doing so in a fiduciary capacity.[ 2Z ] That
applies whether he is a dealer in new securities or whether he is a
dealer in old securities ....In other words, a person who works in an
exchange, ... is acting as the agent[ 2321 for other people so that he is
acting in a fiduciary capacity. 23

223. See MOLEY, AFTER SEVEN YEARS, supra note 48, at 176.
224. See MOLEY, FIRST NEW DEAL, supranote 51, at 311.
225. See Roosevelt Presidential Press Conferences, Number 7 (Mar. 29, 1933), in I COMPLETE
PRESIDENTIAL PRESS CONFERENCES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 88 (1972).
226. See Huston Thompson, Diary Entry for Mar. 13, 1933 (unpublished manuscript available
in the Papers of Huston Thompson, Box 1, Library of Congress) (on file with Author).
227. See id. Diary Entries for Mar. 19 & 20, 1933.
228. See id. Diary Entry for Mar. 19, 1933.
229. See Letter from Huston Thompson, to Hon. Franklin D. Roosevelt (Mar. 28, 1933)
(available in Official Files, Number 242, in the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, New
York) (on file with Author).
230. Roosevelt, supra note 225, at 88.
231. In a fiduciary relationship, the client or entrustor depends on the fiduciary and is entitled
to trust and rely on the fiduciary's honesty. See Tamar Frankel, FiduciaryDuties as Default Rules,
74 OR. L. REv. 1209, 1215-30 (1995) (distinguishing entitlement to trust under fiduciary law, from
caveat emptor under contract law). In turn, the fiduciary owes the entrustor a duty of loyalty and a
duty of care. See id.
232. See generally 1 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 1 (1958) ("Agency is the
fiduciary relation which results from the manifestation of consent by one person to another that the
other shall act on his behalf and subject to his control, and consent by the other so to act.").
233. Roosevelt, supranote 225, at 89.
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The second proposal was made to Richard Whitney, President of
the New York Stock Exchange. A few weeks after the inauguration,
Whitney and the new President had a discussion on topics of mutual
interest.' In their conversation the two Presidents discussed several of
the problems contributing to the economic crisis.'" In addition, FDR
proposed a means for accomplishing the moral reform of Wall Street.
Specifically, FDR raised the possibility of the New York Stock
Exchange adopting a simple code of ethics-simple enough, FDR
apparently said, for the public to understand.2 Whitney expressed some
doubt about whether any code for the securities industry "could be made
simple enough for the public to understand."' ' He nevertheless assured
the President that the vast majority of the Exchange's members were
"anxious to put the security business on a higher plane than it has ever
been before." 'The idea of a simple code of ethics appears to have been more than
just a suggestion for the New York Stock Exchange. FDR did not limit
his proposal to the Exchange. He told Whitney that he hoped the code
"might become a universal standard."," In their conversation, the two
Presidents spent some time discussing how regulations adopted by the
New York Stock Exchange could be made applicable to other
exchanges:2 ° In addition, FDR appears to have viewed the simplicity of
the code as a serious matter.2 4' At about the same time he was suggesting
a simple code to Whitney, he was urging Thompson to cut down the
length and detail of the disclosure bill.2'2 Thus, while the specific context
of the proposal was a suggestion to Whitney, FDR did not limit his ideas
to the New York Stock Exchange.
In these two proposals, extending the fiduciary doctrine to the
buying and selling of securities and creating a code of ethics for the
234. For a description of this discussion, see Letter from Richard Vhitney, to Hon. Frilin D.
Roosevelt (Apr. 14, 1933) (unpublished letter available in 8 LEGtSLATIVE HIsOay OF Te

SECURMrES EXCHA'GE Acr OF 1934, SEC Library, Washington, D.C.) (on ile with Author).
235. FDR and Whitney talked about discouraging trading abuses, such as pols and tmdrs
using short sales to force price declines; about how the securities industry could be segregated into

different segments, such as brokers, dealers, and private bankers; and how the Feral Re-er-.e
could restrict the credit available for stock market speculation without penalizing commercial and
industrial transactions. See id. at 1-4.
236. See id. at 5-6 (mentioning FDR's proposal and responding to his apparent suSestion that
it be made simple enough for the public to understand).
237. Id. at 6.
238. Id. at 7.
239. Id. at 6.
240. See id. at 4-5.
241. See supratext accompanying note 236.
242. See supratext accompanying note 228.
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securities industry that would be simple enough for the public to
understand, FDR suggested specific regulatory vehicles for
implementing his moral purpose. These proposals demonstrated that
FDR expected concrete action to follow on his campaign and transition
rhetoric. In fact, in the coming months and years, action would be taken
to turn this vision into a regulatory regime. Indeed, by the time FDR
made these statements, the legislative process had already begun.
III. FROM POLICY VISION TO REGULATORY REGIME
When FDR turned from the Brains Trust to Brandeis and Baruch,
he did more than shift his favor among competing advisers. He changed
the fundamental nature of his policy towards the securities industry. The
regulatory regime would be animated by an orthodox Progressive vision.
It would be concerned with moral character, honesty, and codes of
conduct, not with the planning and control demanded by 1930s era
"engineering." 43
The Brains Trust believed that the federal government should
direct, and to some degree actually absorb, the core functions of the
securities industry.4 8 Their program sought to make the securities
2 4 The
industry responsible by subjecting it to an economic government.
federal government, through a Capital Issues Board/Federal Economic
Council, would control the allocation of capital among and within
industries, including, apparently, the soundness, value, and distribution
of securities.246 The fundamental purpose of these arrangements would
be to eliminate the waste of an unplanned capital market.247 On May 22,
1932, in the Oglethorpe Speech, FDR signaled his agreement with this
vision of the future regulatory regime.m
Brandeis and Baruch offered a very different vision. For them, the
ultimate goal was to transform the securities industry from within. For
Brandeis this meant making bankers professionals by vesting them with
the loyalty, independence, and competence that professionals bring to
their work. 9 For Baruch it meant restoring the psychology of confidence

243. See supra Part l1.B (developing and articulating FDR's revised policy vision that
eventually served as the cornerstone of the nation's securities acts).

244.
245.
246.
247.
248.

See supra text accompanying notes 53-57.
See supra text accompanying notes 51-52.
See supra text accompanying notes 53-57.
See supra text accompanying notes 80-83.
See supra text accompanying notes 77-90.

249. See supra text accompanying notes 125-30.
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through a variety of policies, including business self-governmentY The
fundamental purpose of these arrangements would be to restore the
character of the securities industry and the confidence of the business
community. On August 4, 1932, at the Albany meeting of campaign
policy advisers, FDR signaled his turn to this point of view.
By the time Congress took up securities regulation in the spring of
1933, the decisive policy decision had been made. FDR's program
would be based on character, not control. Some contemporaries
continued to fear that FDR had radical plans. 2' The new President knew
better. He wrote that honest sellers of securities had nothing to fear, and
that some were "seeing things at night."' 3 Of course, what they were
seeing was the ghost of the Oglethorpe Speech. FDR would be haunted
by that ghost, and by the accusation that his current policy was only
"'camouflage"' for a more radical effort to control business.-" Moreover,
the continuing efforts of some liberals in favor of a national planning
board could not have helped him.?2 Administration spokespersons took
pains to say that no Capital Issues Committee was hidden in the
President's legislative proposals.26 The New Deal would witness many
experiments with public planning, especially in the areas of power,
agriculture, and regional development.2" But for the securities industry,
when the future regulatory regime hung in the balance, FDR chose
another path.
There is, however, a wide gulf between the general direction
pointed out by FDR and a functioning regulatory regime. His moral
rhetoric provided a purpose, but it did not provide the standards,
requirements, and prohibitions that constitute regulation. Others would
supply those more exacting measures.

250. See supratext accompanying notes 170-71. 175-76.

251. See supratext accompanying notes 189-95.
252. See, e.g., 78 CONG. REC. 7944 (1934) (statement of Rep. Britten) (stating that the trn.
objective of securities legislation was to "Russianize everything" through control of credit and othzr
restrictions).

253. Letter from Hon. Franklin D. Roosevelt, to John S. Larence (May 18. 1933) (available
in Personal & Private Files, Number 101, in the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library. Hyde Park. New
York) (on file with Author).

254. See 78 CONG. REc. 8108 (1934) (statement of Rep. Sutphin).
255. See, e.g., 77 CONG. REc. 2927-28 (1933) (statement of Rep. Kelly).
256. See Stock Exchange Practices: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Banking and

Currency, 73d Cong. 6531, 6506 (1934) [hereinafter Senate Stock Erchange Hearings] (staten,.nt
of Thomas Corcoran, Counsel for the Reconstruction Finance Corporation).
257. See generally ALAN BRINKLEY, THE END OF REFoRM.: NE ; DEm. IlBMt AM.. V4
RECESSION AND WAR (1995) (discussing FDRs programs and the ideology upon %%hich his
programs rested).
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The process of transforming moral vision into regulation took place
in three distinct phases. In the first, in 1933 and 1934, Congress dealt
with the President's bills on disclosure and stock exchanges." 8 Moral
purpose played a role in the legislative histories of both.29 In the second,
beginning in 1934, there was a new participant in the regulatory process.
The SEC, an independent regulatory commission created by the
Exchange Act,6 quickly demonstrated its commitment to the President's
moral vision.2 6' In the third, from 1936 to 1940, the SEC sought to apply
that vision in its regulatory program.2 62 The fundamental institutions of
the modem regulatory regime for the securities industry emerged from
this process.
A.

The President'sLegislative Program

1. Securities Act of 1933: Underwriters' Moral Responsibility
In March 1933, Congress took up the President's disclosure bill. 6
It would become the Securities Act of 1933 ("Securities Act"). 6 4 As the
administration's first securities bill, its legislative history closely
reflected the policy vision articulated by the new President.
Congressmen expressed concern about investors' "shattered
confidence in the business and financial structure of the Nation."265 They
attributed this failure of confidence to the "unethical practices of6
promoters and fly-by-night investment propositions" of the prior era.'
They also suggested that a staggering portion of the securities issued
during the bubble economy of the 1920s had been tainted with fraud. 61
In fact, the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, chaired by
Congressman Rayburn, stated that fully half of the securities floated in
the United States since the World War were worthless. t 6 The Committee
258. See infra Part III.A.
259. See infra Part Il.A.
260. See supranote 21.
261. See infra Part Il.B.
262. See infra Part lII.C.
263. See 77 CONG. REC. 937 (1933) (message from President Roosevelt).
264. Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, 48 Stat. 74 (1933) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 77a-77b (1994)).
265. 77 CONG. REc. 2939 (1933) (statement of Rep. Kopplemann).
266. Id.
267. See H.R. REP. No. 73-85, at 2 (1933).
268. See id. This estimate came from a Department of Commerce study. See FederalSecurities
Act: Hearing on H.R. 4314 Before the Comm.on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 73d Cong. 75
(1933) [hereinafter House 1933 Hearing] (statement of Walter L. Miller, Chief, Foreign Service
Division, Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce).
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continued, stating that "[tjhe flotation of such a mass of essentially
fraudulent securities was made possible because of the complete
abandonment by many underwriters and dealers in securities of those
standards of fair, honest and prudent dealing that should be basic to the
encouragement of investment in any enterprise." : '
Congressman Mapes, a leading member of Congressman Rayburn's
Committee, explicitly described this failure as a matter of character. He
said:
I have always wanted to believe in the copy-book statements that those
who occupy high positions in the business and financial world were
not only men of ability but men of character as well; that the fact that
they occupied such positions was an evidence that they were men
worthy of confidence. The revelations of the last few years have had a
tendency to shake my faith in that respect.27
He then described a public offering by four leading underwriters in
which both the amount of the issue and the security behind it had been
mischaracterized. 2' Congressman Mapes concluded:
[Flour investment banking houses supposed to be reputable-at least,
they had a reputation for being reputable before they were put to the
test by this depression ... put out statements which were totally
misleading and
in some respects false, in order to secure the sale of
2
these bonds. rThis focus on investment bankers' reputation had a practical
significance. As one Representative put it, the "very names" of banking
houses of high reputation "lend confidence to the public."'
Unfortunately, the Congressman believed, the bankers had exploited
their reputation, and the confidence it engendered, to sell securities "not
worth the paper they are written on."' 4 As another Congressman added
later in the debate, bankers and brokers had solicited the confidence of
the public only so they could foist securities on them, without any regard
for their "moral duty" to verify the underlying security of what they
were selling 27'

269. H.R. REP. NO. 73-85, at 2.
270. 77 CONG. REc. 2912 (1933) (statement of Rep. Mapes).

271. See id.
272. Id.
273. Id. at 2930 (statement of Rep. McFadden).

274. Id.
275. See id. at 2951 (statement of Rep. Eltse).
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Senators expressed similar sentiments. In particular, Senator
Norbeck, former Chairman of the Senate Committee investigating stock
market abuses,276 spoke on this point. He described an investment
banking house that had been involved with Samuel Insull, the utility
magnate whose operations collapsed amid massive fraud, as "one of our
large financial institutions which had built up a fine reputation during
years of square dealing, only to sell out that reputation during the
boom."'2"1Or, in describing how a bank conducted its securities business,
"[tihis is another instance of a reputable banking house with a century of
growth and confidence back of it suddenly going wrong in the hands of
unsound management, who were so anxious for immediate gain that
greed got the better of their judgment."'7' "We all hope for an early
business recovery," Senator Norbeck remarked, "but that is impossible
without a return to plain, old-fashioned business honesty. 279
Members in both chambers also expressed the view that legitimate
business needed protection from dishonest competition. As the Senate
Committee Report put it, the bill's aim was to protect the investing
public and "honest enterprise[] seeking capital by honest presentation,
against the competition afforded by dishonest securities offered to the
public through crooked promotion., 20 As one Representative explained:
This legislation is designed to protect not only the investing public but
at the same time to protect honest corporate business. The honest
director and underwriter will have no fear of the provisions of this law.
One of its purposes is to protect them from the illegitimate competition
of financial racketeers.2'
Congressional aspirations for a restoration of bankers' "old-time
sense of ethics" echoed FDR's policy. His moral vision had found a
home in the legislature. The extent to which his ideas had penetrated
congressional thinking is shown by Congressman Rayburn's description
of how the Act would affect the securities industry. It would, he said,
make underwriters and dealers "responsible. 283 This was a familiar
concept in the contemporary climate of opinion, but its meaning had
been transformed. For Berle, responsible investment banking meant
276.
277.
278.
279.
280.
281.
282.
283.

See supra text accompanying note 37.
77 CONG. REc. 3231 (1933) (statement of Sen. Norbeck).
Id. at 3232.
Id.
S. REP. No. 73-47, at 1 (1933).
77 CONG. REc. 2935 (1933) (statement of Rep. Chapman).
Id. at 2914 (statement of Rep. Greenwood).
Id. at 2919 (statement of Rep. Rayburn).
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"thinking not merely whether a bond issue or loan can be repaid, but
whether the enterprise ought to be started at all.''" For Rayburn it meant
the honesty with which the securities were sold. As Rayburn explained
it, the bill made underwriters and dealers "responsible civilly if [they]
sell[] stocks upon a misrepresentation; it makes [them] guilty of fraud
and criminally liable if [they] sell] it with misrepresentation[s] and
fraudulent intent."' ' Two sections in particular implemented these goals.
Section 12(2) extended civil liability to any person who "sells a
security ... by means of a prospectus or oral communication, which
includes an untrue statement of a material fact or omits to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements [therein] ... not
misleading." 6 Liability was to the purchaser, but only if the purchaser
did not know of the untruth or omissionPm Finally, sellers could avoid
liability if they could sustain the burden of proof that they "did not
know, and in the exercise of reasonable care could not have known, of
such untruth or omission."' ' Contemporaries described this provision as
a statutory declaration of common law liability. "
Section 17(a) prohibited fraud in the sale of securities.? It made it
unlawful for any person in the sale of any securities ... (1) to employ
any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, ... (2) to obtain money...
by means of any untrue statement of a material fact or any omission to
state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in
... light of the circumstances under which they were made, not
misleading, or (3) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of
business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the
purchaser.2 9 '

284. A.A. Berle, Jr., A High Roadfor Business,93 SCRIBNER'S MAo. 325,330 (1933).
285. 77 CONG. REc. 2919 (1933) (statement of Rep. Raybum).
286. Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, § 12(2), 48 Stat. 74, 84 (1933) (codified as am=ded at 15

U.S.C. § 771(a)(2) (1994)).
287. See id. Liability was limited to sellers in privity with the buyer. See generallyWVdliam 0.
Douglas & George E. Bates, The Federal SecuritiesAct of 1933,43 YALELJ. 171, 177 (1933).
288. Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, § 12(2), 48 Stat. 74, 84 (1933) (codified as am-,nded at 15

U.S.C. § 771(2) (1994)).
289. See Baldvin B. Bane, Address at the Bond Club of Philadelphia 7 (Dzc. 21, 1933)

(transcript available in the SEC Library at 2 SEC Speeches, 1934-61).
290. See Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, § 17(a), 48 Stat. 74, 84-85 (1933) (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1994)).
291. Id.
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Based on existing New York law,29 this provision appears to have
been relatively uncontroversial, with even members of the investment

banking community speaking in its favor.293
Sections 12(2) and 17(a) strongly reflected the President's moral
vision. They reached conduct inconsistent with plain, old-fashioned
business honesty. They were based on existing law, either common law
or statutory. In short, they expressed, in the language of the law, the
purpose of moral restoration repeatedly expressed by FDR and members
of Congress. This purpose was further reflected in a third, somewhat

different provision. That provision was section 11, particularly as it
applied to underwriters. 2 4
Section 11 made underwriters liable for any untrue statement of a
material fact in a registration statement, 295 or the omission of a material
fact that was required to be stated therein, or was necessary to make the
statements therein not misleading. w6 Underwriters could escape this
liability by showing that, after a reasonable investigation, they had
reasonable grounds to believe, and did believe, that the statements were
true and that there was no such omission.2' 9 The standard of
reasonableness by which such investigations were to be judged was "that
required of a person occupying a fiduciary relationship. 293
The moral purpose animating this duty of investigation, now known
as "due diligence," can be seen in the provision's legislative history. The
bill Thompson drafted for FDR did not expressly include underwriters in
the civil liability provision. After a few days of hearings, Congressman
Rayburn asked Raymond Moley for help in redrafting, and Moley
brought in a new group to assist him.299 The new group consisted of Felix

292. See Securities Act: Hearings on S. 875 Before the Senate Comm. on Banking and
Currency, 73d Cong. 247 (1933) (statement of Ollie M. Butler, Attorney, Department of
Commerce).
293. See House 1933 Hearing, supra note 268, at 158-59 (statement of Frank M. Gordon,
President, Investment Bankers' Association of America) (expressing support for provisions
preventing and punishing fraud).
294. See infra notes 295-303.
295. The registration statement was a new requirement, established by the Securities Act, to
implement the President's policy in favor of full disclosure about securities offerings.
296. See Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, § I 1(a)(5), 48 Stat. 74, 82 (1933) (codified as amended
at 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a)(5) (1994)).
297. See Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, § 1l(b)(3), 48 Stat. 74, 82 (1933) (codified as amended
at 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b)(3) (1994)).
298. Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, § I1(c), 48 Stat. 74, 83 (1933) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. § 77k(c) (1994)).
299. See MOLEY, FIRST NEW DEAL, supranote 51, at 312.
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Frankfurter, James Landis, Thomas Corcoran and Benjamin Cohen. ' Among other provisions, section 11 emerged from their redrafting."'
After the bill was revised, Rayburn's Committee explicitly linked this
section to underwriters' moral responsibility. The Committee Report
said that "[f]or those whose moral responsibility to the public is
particularly heavy, there is a correspondingly heavier legal liability."3: A
"return to the ancient truths of fair dealing" would be achieved by
holding underwriters to the standards imposed by law upon a
fiduciary."
The moral purpose of the Securities Act should not be forgotten.
Underwriters, dealers, and those who sell securities would be
responsible, but now this meant that the law would hold them to their
moral responsibility. As Congressman Beedy said on the floor of the
House, the Securities Act "setf- up a standard of business morality in
this country for men engaged in the private business of issuing and
selling securities." ' This standard, the House Committee Report said,
"carrie[d] over into the general field of security selling, ethical standards
of honesty and fair dealing common to every fiduciary undertaking."'_1
2. Securities Exchange Act of 1934: The Need for Honesty and
Justifiable Trust in a Highly Liquid Economy
In February 1934, Congress took up the President's stock exchange
bil. 36 It would become the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ("Exchange
Act") 7 In 1933, when FDR sent his disclosure bill to Congress, he
hoped that the stock exchange bill would be ready in ten days.7 " In fact,
it would take almost a year to prepare the bill, and in the meantime, the
mood in Congress had dramatically changed. The stock exchange bill
faced bitter opposition, and its legislative history was long, involved and
contentious!" The President's moral purpose survived in this

300. See James M. Landis, The Legislative History of the Securities Act of 1933. 28 GEO.
WASH. L. REv. 29,33 (1959).
301. SeeH-R5480,73dCong.§ 11(1933).

302. HMR. REP. No. 73-85, at 9 (1933).
303. I& at 5.
304. 77 CoNG. REc. 2953 (1933) (statement of Rep. Beedy) (addressing the requirement that
the prospectus display certain information conspicuously and in certain ty.).
305. H.R. REP. No. 73-85, at 5.

306. See 78 CONG. REc. 2264 (1934) (statement of Sen. Fletcher).
307. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404.48 Sta. 881 (1934) (codified as amended at 15

U.S.C. §§ 78a-7811(1994)).
308. See Roosevelt, supranote 225, at 90.
309. See generally SELGIMAN, supra note 37, at 73-100.
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environment, but it was given a new focus, and subjected to heightened
challenge.
In many respects, Congress' debates on the stock exchange bill
appear similar to those on the disclosure bill. Abuses on Wall Street
were again described1 0 and again blamed for the nation's economic
problems."' In this instance, Congress focused on the stock exchanges.
For example, Senator Norris said that as a result of gambling and
manipulation on the exchanges, stock and bond prices had been pushed
artificially high.312 As always, he said, "when the bubble bursts," the
honest investor loses money.1 3 Similarly, Congressman Wolverton said
that "highly organized pools and other manipulative practices,
encouraged by false and misleading statements," had led to wild and
unrestrained speculation, which ultimately played a large part in the
collapse of security values.3"4 Moreover, the abuses that had led to the
collapse in security values continued to impede recovery.3 5 What was
needed, the legislative history reveals again and again, was honest and
fair markets where prices rested on real values.316
There are also indications that the stock exchange bill was
motivated by moral aspirations similar to those expressed during the
previous year. There were suggestions that at least some manipulative
practices were morally wrong, 317 and that the provisions of the bill
regulating them were the "moral" part of the Exchange Act.' Senator
Fletcher, for example, said that the New Deal program was "a moral
attitude in governmental action."3 9 Applying this principle to the stock
exchange bill, he said that its cardinal principles were: "first, restoring as
a rule of moral and economic conduct, a sense of fiduciary obligation;
and, second, establishing social responsibility, as distinguished from
individual gain, as the goal. 320
310. See, e.g., 78 CONG. REC. 8165-74 (1934) (statement of Sen. Fletcher) (describing the
findings of Senate investigative hearings).
311. See S. REP. No.73-792, at 3-4 (1934).
312. See 78 CONG. REC. 8394 (1934) (statement of Sen. Norris).
313. Id.
314. Id. at 7863 (statement of Rep. Wolverton).
315. See S. REP. No. 73-792, at 4.
316. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No.73-1383, at 10-11 (1934); 78 CONG. REc. 7717 (1934) (statement
of Rep. Ford); id. at 7922 (statement of Rep. Mapes).
317. See Stock Exchange Regulation: Hearing on H.R. 7852 and H.R. 8720 Before the House
Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 73d Cong. 741 (1934) [hereinafter House 1934
Hearing] (statement of Lothrop Withington, representing a Committee of New England Security
Dealers, Brokers and Dealer-Brokers).
318. See 78 CONG. REC. 7933 (1934) (statement of Rep. Kenney).
319. Id. at 8161 (statement of Sen. Fletcher).
320. Id.
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Despite these similarities, the legislative history of the stock
exchange bill differed in two significant respects from that of the
disclosure bill. First, supporters of the later bill stated a more developed
theory about why moral integrity was needed in the modem economy."'
Second, by the time of the later bill, the voices of skepticism had rallied,
and they directly challenged the idea that Wall Street's ethics could be
improved*"
In 1933, Congress attributed the specific conditions of the
economic crisis, a mass of worthless securities, to underwriters' ethical
failures. 32 In 1934, the honesty of financial intermediaries was given a
role that transcended contemporary conditions.?2 Their probity was now
considered an essential element of the modem economy. In articulating
this theory, the report issued by Congressman Rayburn's Committee
said that "[i]f investor confidence [was] to come back to the benefit of
exchanges and corporations alike, the law must advance."' Specifically:
As a complex society so diffuses and differentiates the financial
interests of the ordinary citizen that he has to trust others and cannot
personally watch the managers of all his interests as one horse trader
watches another, it becomes a condition of the very stability of that
society that its rules of law and of business practice recognize and
protect that ordinary citizen's dependent position. Unless constant
extension of the legal conception of a fiduciary relationship-a
guarantee of "straight shooting"--supports the constant extension of
mutual confidence which is the foundation of a maturing and
complicated economic system, easy liquidity of the resources in which
wealth is invested is a danger rather than a prop to the stability of that
system.326
In other words, easy liquidity, without mutual confidence, can be
dangerously unstable. Therefore, since "straight shooting" maintains
mutual confidence, it preserves social stability. The Rayburn Committee
summed this up by saying: "When everything everyone owns can be
sold at once, there must be confidence not to sell. Just in proportion as it
becomes more liquid and complicated, an economic system must

321.

See infra text accompanying notes 324-27.

322. See infra text accompanying notes 328-29.
323. See supra text accompanying notes 265-79.

324. See M.R. REP. No. 73-1383, at 3 (1934).
325. Id. at 5.

326. Id.
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become more moderate, more honest, and more justifiably selftrusting."'3 2
The legislative history of the stock exchange bill also differed from
that of the prior year in the vigor with which skeptics attacked the bill's
moral purpose. 328 The skeptics directly challenged the bill's foundational
premise that the law could make financial intermediaries more honest
and more trustworthy.329 Even the bill's supporters seem to have lost
their moral fervor. For example, in 1933, Congressman Beedy said that
the Securities Act set up a standard of business morality for those selling
securities, and that he commended and endorsed it.3 In 1934, he said
that he would vote for the stock exchange bill, but he also said:
Here is an act which says we must put American business in a straitjacket. Under compulsion of law we must set up a standard of business
ethics and hold the iron hand of Government over it....
...The theory of it is that we should put these exchanges in a
strait-jacket. We should hold over them the iron hand of compulsion
by Government, and we should drive them to a course of honesty.
As I read my history, ... we are doomed to be very much
disappointed in the final results. You cannot make men honest by law.
You cannot clean up business under legal compulsion. The wits of man
will thwart every attempt you make.33'
Supporters of the bill seemed resigned to this view. As one
Congressman put it, "[w]e cannot legislate honesty into Wall Street, but
we can legislate to make that gang toe the mark." 32
The stock exchange bill was enacted in this atmosphere.
Congressman Lea, a key member of Rayburn's Committee, explained
the bill's approach. It was, he said, "severe in its denunciation and

327. Id.
328. They also attacked the due diligence standard set out in the Securities Act. As a result of
this pressure, the standard was changed from that of a fiduciary to that required of "a prudent man in
the management of his own property." 15 U.S.C. § 77k(c) (1994). Both Senator Fletcher and James
Landis indicated that the amendment was intended to restate the meaning of a fiduciary relationship
without using that term. See 78 CONG. REc. 8669 (1934) (explanatory memorandum of Sen.
Fletcher); id. at 8716 (communication from James Landis to Sen. Fletcher).
329. Several members also emphasized the impossibility of protecting the "suckers" of the
world. See, e.g., 78 CONG. REc. 8490 (1934) (statement of Sen. Hastings).
330. See 77 CONG. REC. 2953 (1933) (statement of Rep. Beedy).
331. 78 CONG. REc. 7930 (1934) (statement of Rep. Beedy).
332. Id. at 8103 (statement of Rep. Johnson) (arguing for a one percent transfer tax on all
securities transactions).

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol29/iss4/2

36

Walsh: A Simple Code of Ethics: A History of the Moral Purpose Inspiring
A SIMPLE CODE OF ETHICS

20011

penalties for manipulative" practices by brokers and dealers.?' "It is
going to be dangerous," he said, "to engage in ...fraudulent and
deceptive methods for the purpose of defrauding investors. "'

The specific measures were set forth in two provisions. The first
would become section 9 of the Act.' s It prohibited several types of
abusive transactions on securities exchanges. These were all transactions

that had been identified during the Senate's investigative hearings.".

Thus, section 9 prohibited wash sales, matched orders, pools, false or

misleading statements by brokers and dealers for the purpose of inducing
purchases of securities, and other specific practices." 7 The second would

become section 10(b) of the Act." It was a catchall provision that
authorized the regulatory body that would administer the law to prohibit
additional manipulative or deceptive devices or contrivances

in

connection with the purchase or sale of securities on exchanges or
otherwise.

39

As Thomas Corcoran, one of the draftsmen of the bill

explained it, section 10(b) provided that "[t]hou shalt not devise any
other cunning devices."

The legislative history of the Exchange Act reveals an ambiguity in
Congress's moral purpose. On a general level, ethical conduct was given
a foundational role in public policy. "When everything everyone owns
can be sold at once," honesty and justifiable trust build the mutual
confidence needed to hold society together. At the same time, on a more

particular level, the specific provisions that applied most directly to the
conduct of the securities industry were not explained and justified in

moral terms, at least not in the explicitly aspirational language used the
previous year. Section 9 was explained as a straightforward effort to stop
certain specific abuses, " ' and section 10(b) was hardly explained at all.!4"
333. Id. at 7862 (statement of Rep. Lea).
334. Id. (statement of Rep. Lea).
335. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch.404, § 9(a), 48 Star. 881, 859 (1934) 1codified
as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78i(a) (1994)).
336. See Senate Stock Exchange Hearings, supra note 256, at 6506 (statement of Tholmas
Corcoran) (at the time of Corcoran's testimony, § 9 appeared in the bill as § 8).
337. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, oh. 404, § 9(a) 48 Stat. 881, 889-91 I1934)
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.§ 78i(a) (1994)).
338. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, § 10(b), 48 Stat. 881, 891 (1934) Icedifted
as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1994)).
339. See id.
340. House 1934 Hearing,supra note 317, at 115 (statement of Thomas Corcoran?. Th.- SEC
has utilized this section to implement several rules. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.10b-1 to lb-18 (2000).
For a detailed discussion of the legislative history of this provision. see generally Steve Thll. The
OriginalConceptionof Section 10(b) of the SecuritiesErchangeAct, 42 ST,%. L REv. 385 (1990).
341. See House 1934 Hearing, supranote 317, at 115 (statement of Thomas Corcoran).
342. See id. at 115-16.
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Indeed, the most explicit statement about the bill's moral purpose was
made in the context of questioning its efficacy in reaching that goal!"
As a result, the future of FDR's vision could depend on how one chose
to read this ambiguous legislative record. In any event, in the coming
years, the President's moral purpose would be preserved and fostered by
a vigorous new participant in the regulatory process.
B. The CrusadingYoungsters of the Early Securities and Exchange
Commission
In January 1935, Judge John Bums, the SEC's first General
Counsel, 3 appeared before a group of investment bankers."' Judge
Burns spoke about his hope that the group would protect "professional
and business idealism." 6 He also spoke about his hopes for the SEC. It
would, he hoped, "have a permanent and ... very salutary effect on the
business practices of generations to come." 7 This included controlling
the "outlaws" in the securities business, 34 and continuing "the
educational process of elevating corporate standards ... to the end," he
said, "that the principle in business that right is might, will prevail."" 9 At
the end of his address, Bums took questions from the floor. Not all were
friendly. One, in particular, turned Bums' idealism back on him. The
industry's trouble, said the investment banker, was that when they dealt
with the Commission they faced "crusading youngsters., 530 To this Burns
made no specific reply.3"'
One must always be careful about making inferences from silence.
But, in this case, Bums could not deny that many of the Commission's
staff believed themselves to be on a crusade, because the charge was
obviously true. Contemporary statements by early Commissioners and
343. See id. at 116.
344. At that point in time, the SEC was less than a year old. The Exchange Act authorized it to
have a professional staff of lawyers, examiners, and other experts. See Securities Exchange Act of
1934, ch. 404, § 4(b), 48 Stat. 881, 885 (1934) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78d(b)(1)
(1994)). In 1935, at the end of its first year of operations, the Commission and its staff numbered
696 persons. See SEC, 1 ANN. REPORT 38 (1935).
345. See Judge John J. Bums, Address Before the Chairmen of the Investment Bankers
Regional Code Committees (Jan. 15, 1935) (transcript available in the SEC Library at 2 SEC
Speeches, 1934-61).
346. Id. at 2.
347. Id. at 3.
348. See id. at 4.
349. Id. at 7.
350. Id. at 11.
351. See id. Burns responded by describing the steps the SEC was taking, such as creating
regional offices, to reduce the administrative burden on regulated firms. See id.
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staff contain clear and repeated expressions of the view that the
securities laws and the SEC's mission were filled with moral purpose. As
illustrated by this speech, Bums was a leading spokesman for this point
of view. 3 5,
In Bums' view, the crisis of the 1930s had a moral as well as an
economic nature. 3 It was the deadly vice of avarice or greed and the
"failure of morals and religion to put a bridle to the acquisitive motive[s]
of leaders in business [that had] made the intervention of the law
inevitable." 1' These views were reflected in his speeches on securities
regulation. He recognized the importance of good will to the securities
industry, and the tragic consequences it would face when it lost its
reputation for decency and for obeying the law!" He pointed to the low
state of corporate morality on the eve of federal regulation, particularly
in regards to the distribution of securitiesY" He stated that "[p]ublic
confidence [would] retum] with the enforcement of high standards, and
[that] the maintenance of high standards [would be] assured when it
[became] unnecessary to depart from them in order to meet the
competition of lower standards."' Finally, he gave the SEC an
important role in this task, because "no other agency can353
so quickly and
so effectively restore the confidence of the buying public.
Other administrators expressed similar views. Joseph P. Kennedy,
the SEC's first Chairman, said that its most important objective was
"spiritual. 3. 9 He continued:
I do not hesitate to employ that word in connection with finance. We
are seeking to re-create, rebuild, restore confidence. Confidence is an

outgrowth of character. We believe that character exists strongly in the
financial world, so we do not have to compel virtue; we seek to

prevent vice. Our whole formula is to bar wrongdoers from operating
under the aegis of those who feel a sense of ethical responsibility. We

352. See id. at 2.

353. See Judge John J. Bums, Sixty-Sixth Annual Commencement Address, Loyola
University, 7-10 (June 10, 1936) (transcript available in the SEC Library at 2 SEC Splechzs,

1934-61).
354. Id. at 10.
355. See Judge John J. Bums, Address at the Convention of Investment Bankers As ziation of
America 3 (OcL 28, 1935) (transcript available in the SEC Library at 2 SEC Speehes, 1934-61 1.
356. See John J. Bums, Address at the Bondmens Club of Chicago . 5-6 (May 23, 1935)

(transcript available in the SEC Library at 2 SEC Speeches, 1934-61).
357. Id. at 7.
358. Bums, supranote 345, at 3.
359. Hon. Joseph P. Kennedy, Address at the Boston Chamber of Commerce 10 wNov. 15,
1934) (transcript available in the SEC Library at 8 SEC Speeches, 1934-61).
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are eager to see finance as self-contained as it deserves to be when
ruled by honor and responsibility.3W
Kennedy's views are particularly important, both because he was
the Chairman, and also because he had worked closely with FDR during
the campaign.16 ' As a result, Kennedy had enjoyed ample opportunities
in the close quarters of a campaign train to learn Roosevelt's views on
the need for character in the securities industry. Moreover, even after he
had left
the SEC, Kennedy continued to advocate these ideas on FDR's
3 62
behalf.
Other examples could be cited for this point of view. The Director
of the Commission's Trading and Exchange Division said that there was
no room in the securities business other than for "honorable men who
regard themselves as engaged in a great and progressive profession."' 3
These professionals, he said, should have "a deep and abiding
recognition of their grave responsibilities to their clients and the
public."3' 64 In fact, among administrators, this sense of ethical purpose
pre-dated the SEC. In September 1933, Baldwin B. Bane, Chief of the
Securities Division of the Federal Trade Commission, the agency then
responsible for administering the Securities Act, also spoke on this
point. The recent legislative program, he said, was based on a "moral
idea." ' 65 It was the "realization that [the economy's] ills [were] due.., to
the weakening of [the nation's] moral fibre, [and] to easy temporizing
with traditional and tried standards of right and wrong."'36 "It would be
idle," Bane said, "to pretend that [the Securities Act] does not ask
something of the security world, but it also promises much in returnthe opportunity of creating a true and honorable profession by the
assumption and adequate discharge of public responsibilities. 3 67 This

360. Id.
361. See RICHARD J. WHALEN, THE FOUNDING FATHER: THE STORY OF JOSEPH P. KENNEDY
119-29 (1964).
362. See JOSEPH P. KENNEDY, I'M FOR ROOSEVELT 8, 93 (1936) (expressing agreement with
FDR's "judgment that our economic crisis was in effect a moral crisis" in which the "belief that
those in control of the corporate life of America were motivated by honesty and ideals of honorable
conduct was completely shattered").
363. David Saperstein, Address at the National Security Traders Association 4 (Aug. 4, 1936)
(transcript available in the SEC Library at 14 SEC Speeches, 1934-61); see also id. at 13.
364. Id. at 4.
365. Baldwin B. Bane, Address at the Affiliated Better Business Bureaus 4 (Sept. 12, 1933)
(transcript available in the SEC Library at 2 SEC Speeches, 1934-61).
366. Id.
367. Id.
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could be done, Bane said, despite those who "insist[ed] that the morality
of high finance is not the concern of democratic government." The administrators' sense of moral purpose is demonstrated by the
meaning they gave to contemporary ideas. The concept that the
securities industry should be responsible was very much in the air. It had
played an important role in the Brains Trust's advocacy of a Capital
Issues Board/Federal Economic Council,..9 and an equally important
role, though one decidedly different in meaning, in Congressman
Rayburn's advocacy for the bill that became the Securities Act." Early
administrators also expressed it, and their meaning demonstrated their
moral purpose. In 1934, Kennedy said that "[tihe whole motive of the
Security Act is to be found in the effort-the necessary and no longer
escapable effort-to make finance more responsible."'' In his view,
however, responsibility meant acceptance of the new regulations. m
Moreover, he said, those regulations are "simple and honest" and "rest
squarely upon the principles of ethics applicable not only to business but
to everyday life." 3 Fear of economic waste was also in the air. It had
been a central element of the Brains Trust's thinking and had been
prominently featured in the Oglethorpe Speech." ' Early administrators
also feared waste, but they understood it in light of their moral purpose.
Waste was now a result of improper conduct. In 1935, James Landis,
Kennedy's successor as Chairman, said:
Our first consideration, perhaps, in attempting to secure the
maintenance of a desirable investment market, is the elimination of
certain admittedly wrongful practices. Such an objective calls for the
end of those things that mean waste. And fraud means waste. It is
equally true that carelessness and disrespect for the standards that
should govern in the fields of investment have the same wasteful effect
as fraud.'
These administrative expressions of support for the moral purpose
of the securities laws seem to go beyond a mere coincidence of personal
opinion. They suggest, instead, something of an institutional ethos.
368. Id. at 1.
369. See supra text accompanying notes 91-101.
370. See supra text accompanying notes 283-85.
371. Joseph P. Kennedy, Address at the National Press Club 3 (July 25. 1934) (tran-ript
available in the SEC Library at 8 SEC Speeches, 1934-61).
372. See id.
373. Id.
374. See supra text accompanying notes 79-86.
375. James M.Landis, Address Before the New England Council 1 (Nov. ' 19351 Itranxenipt
available in the SEC Library at 9 SEC Speeches, 1934-61).
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There are several reasons for thinking so. First, in some instances the
institutional nature of the opinion appears relatively certain. Given

Kennedy's reputation as an unreformed speculator-he was participating
in pools as late as 1933 376-one

could easily suspect that his epiphany

about finance's spiritual dimension came after he was made Chairman of
the SEC. Similarly, as a private citizen, William 0. Douglas mocked the
Securities Act as "a nineteenth-century piece of legislation" that could
not be understood unless one could "'turn back the clock' to 'simpler

days.",'31 While Douglas squarely placed himself in the camp previously
occupied by the Brains Trust,3 78 as a member of the SEC, he affirmed
that the agency was striving "for the ancient standards of simple honesty
in the sale of securities."379 He also urged securities salespersons to have
a meticulous regard for the standards of conduct governing fiduciaries."'

Moreover, Chairmen and Commissioners have continued to reaffirm this
vision into the present.381 Finally, the agency has recently identified the

promotion of high ethical standards 3in
82 the securities industry as one of
the goals animating its strategic plan.

The moral purpose inspiring early administrators, and continuing in
some degree through the life of the agency, shows how far the regulatory
regime had moved from the ideas of the Brains Trust and the Oglethorpe
Speech. Even the core concerns of the Brains Trust, responsibility and
waste, had been given a moral content. Administrators understood their

mission in terms of the ethical principles applicable to both business and
everyday life. Their goal, as Bums put it, was to give a new and different
spiritual influence to the "individualistic hard-boiled immorality of the
376. See WHALEN, supra note 361, at 130-35.
377. William 0. Douglas, Protectingthe Investor, 23 YALE REv. 521,529 (1934).
378. See id. at 530 (calling for "a plan for control" of business that would include "the
increments of profit and control[,] ...terms and conditions of the organization, ... amount of
securities [that] may be issued, the terms on which they may be issued, and the persons to whom
they may be sold").
379. William 0. Douglas, Address Before the Foundation for the Advancement of the Social
Sciences 2 (June 22, 1938) (transcript available in the SEC Library at 4 SEC Speeches, 1934-61).
380. See William 0. Douglas, Customers' Men (Nov. 1936), in DEMOCRACY AND FINANCE:
THE ADDRESSES AND PUBLIC STATEMENTS OF WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS AS MEMBER AND CHAIRMAN
OFTHE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION 107, 118-19 (James Allen ed., 1940).
381. See, e.g., J. Carter Beese, The Role of Ethics in Protecting the U.S. Capital Markets,
Remarks at the AIMR Conference on Ethics 8 (Nov. 3, 1993) (transcript available in the SEC
Library at 1 SEC Speeches 1993); Arthur Levitt, "Values Add Value," Remarks on the Trinity
Church Tercentenary 5 (Mar. 18, 1997), available at http:llwww.sec.gov/newslspeeches (last visited
Oct. 10, 2001).
382. See U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission GPRA Strategic Plan (Sept. 1997) (citing to the fourth objective of Goal #1), available
at http:llwww.sec.gov/aboutlgpra.shtml (last visited Oct. 10, 2001).
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ancient law."' Through the securities laws, Bums said, "law has caught

up with morals."'3 s
C. . Building the Institutionsof a Regulatory Regime
The statutory mandate Congress gave the SEC provided the new
agency with immediate opportunities to act on its moral purpose. This
was particularly true in regard to the over-the-counter markets"" and
investment advisers. In essence, Congress left it up to the SEC to decide
how the over-the-counter markets should be regulated. In the Exchange

Act, Congress preserved the securities exchanges' system of selfregulation, subject after 1934 to SEC registration and oversight."'

Working within this institutional structure, the Commission spent its
first months studying how exchanges governed themselves, and
recommending various improvements" s ' For the over-the-counter
markets, however, Congress declined to establish any comparable
institutional structure. Instead, it simply provided for the Commission to
prescribe rules that would insure investors in the over-the-counter
markets protection comparable to that provided by organized
' Thus, for the over-the-counter markets, the SEC would
exchanges.3s
have to create its own regulatory structure. Similarly, in 1935, Congress
instructed the Commission to study investment trusts. ' As part of its
review, the agency also studied investment advisers." The regulatory
regime for advisers emerged from this study. In both of these areas,
383. John J. Bums, Speech at Phillips Brooks House Association 10 (Apr. 5. 1935) 1tran -ript
available in the SEC Library at 2 SEC Speeches 1934-61).
384. Id.
385. "Over-the-counter" is a generic term used to describe all markets for trading cEzurities
other than organized exchanges. See, eg., BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1130 (7th ed. 19991.
386. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934. ch. 404. § 6.48 Stat. 881. 885-86 (19341 (ce-ldfied
as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78f (1994)). As one contemporary commentator put it.
the Act
transformed the exchanges into public utilities, which must be operated for the good of all. See
CHARLES H. MEYER, A PLANNED ECONOMY FOR WALL STREEr. S.Doc. No. 74-81. at 3 (19351
(article reprinted from THE AmERICAN SCHOLAR (Summer 1935)).
387. See REPORT ON THE GOVERNMENT OF SECURITIES FXCttAN ES. H.R. Doc. No. 74-85. at
17 (1935) (illustrating that recommendations went to governance, arbitration. apteals from
decisions of business conduct committees, and proper handling of customer complaints).
388. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, § 15.48 Stat. 881.895-96(19341 (coddfied
as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78o(a)(1) (1994)).
389. See Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, ch.687, § 30.49 Stat. 803, 837 (19351.
The directive to study investment trusts was struck out by amendment in 1987. See 15 U.S.C.
§ 79z-4 (1994).
390. See generally SEC, REPORT ON INVESTMENT COUNSEL, INVESTmIENT AN.AGV. ENT.
INVESTMENT SUPERVISORY, AND INIVESTENT ADVISORY SERVICES (19391 [hereinafter SEC,
REPORT ON INVESTMENT COUNSEL].
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administrators had an opportunity to give their purpose concrete
regulatory form.
1. Exchange Act Amendments of 1936: Eliminating the Unfit
In 1934, the SEC's first Chairman told the Boston Chamber of
Commerce that "character exists strongly in the financial world," and
39 Instead,
therefore, the SEC "[did] not have to compel virtue.""
it
3
"[sought] to prevent vice." The agency's whole formula, Kennedy
continued, was "to bar wrongdoers from operating under the aegis of
those who feel a sense of ethical responsibility. 3 " At the staff level,
contemporaries articulated this thinking in the form of concrete
regulatory objectives. Specifically, the Director of the SEC's Trading
and Exchange Division said that the agency's efforts were directed
toward three goals: (1) eliminating the unfit from the securities business;
(2) vitalizing certain principles of fair practice; and (3) encouraging the
formation of self-governing associations."' Within a few years, all of
these goals would be institutionalized within the regulatory regime.
The SEC's regulatory strategy relied heavily on creating a
registration system for broker-dealers. Initially, the Commission
developed its own administrative system. Its goal was to establish simple
requirements that an experienced applicant could easily meet, but that
would also give the SEC an effective means of controlling the outlaws in
the business 9 In 1936, congressional action sought to codify this
system.3' 9 This led to the Exchange Act Amendments of 1936 ("1936
Amendments"). 3' The 1936 Amendments provided a statutory basis for
the SEC's program to eliminate the unfit from the securities business. In
effect, they restricted membership in the industry to firms that could
pass something like a good character test. Perhaps, stated more exactly,

391. Kennedy, supranote 359, at 10.
392. Id.
393. Id.
394. See David Saperstein, Address Before the Boston Securities Traders Association 3 (Apr.
23, 1936) (transcript available in the SEC Library at 14 SEC Speeches, 1934-61).
395. See Bums, supra note 345, at 4; see also Exchange Act Release No. 211 (May 6, 1935),
availableat 1935 SEC LEXIS 179 (adopting registration requirements for over-the-counter brokerdealers).
396. See Unlisted Securities: Hearing Before the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce, 74th Cong. 10 (May 6, 1936) [hereinafter House Unlisted Securities Hearing]
(statement of James Landis, Chairman, SEC); accord H.R. REP. No. 74-2601, at 4 (1936); S.REP.
No. 74-1739, at 3 (1936).
397. See Securities Exchange Act Amendments of 1936, ch. 462, 49 Stat. 1375 (1936)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
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they restricted membership to firms that did not fail a bad character test.
This was accomplished in two provisions, sections 15(b)" and 15(c)."

Section 15(b) authorized the Commission to deny or revoke the
registration of broker-dealers on several grounds, including false

statements made during registration;"' conviction within the previous ten
years of "any felony or misdemeanor... involv[ing] the purchase or sale
of any security" or the conduct of a broker-dealer;-" being enjoined from

"engaging in or continuing any conduct or practice in connection ...
with the purchase or sale of any security";

or willfully violating any

provision of the Securities Act or the Exchange Act:- In carrying out
this authority, the Commission is to act by order, "after notice and
opportunity for [a] hearing." 4" By mid-1937, the Commission had
revoked the registrations of sixteen broker-dealers.-"
Section 15(c) was intended to supplement the registration system."
Specifically, it forbade broker-dealers from effecting transactions or
inducing the purchase or sale of securities in the over-the-counter
markets by means of any "manipulative, deceptive or other fraudulent
device or contrivance."

7

The scope of this provision is much broader

than the antifraud provisions enacted in 1934. Section 9 of the Exchange
Act reached only certain defined transactions on securities exchanges. 3
Even section 10(b), the Exchange Act's catchall provision, had narrower
terms. Section 10(b) reaches "manipulative or deceptive device[s] or

398. Securities Exchange Act Amendments of 1936. ch. 462, sec. 3. § 15tbl. 49 Stat. 1375.
1377-78 (1936) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78ofb) (1994)).
399. Securities Exchange Act Amendments of 1936, ch. 462. sec. 3.§ 151c). 49 Stat. 1375.
1378 (1936) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78o(c)(1) (1994)).
400. See Securities Exchange Act Amendments of 1936, ch. 462. sec. 3. § 151b). 49 Stat. 1375,
1378 (1936) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(4)tA) (1994)).
401. Securities Exchange Act Amendments of 1936. ch. 462, sec. 3. § 15th). 49 Stat. 1375.
1378 (1936) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78ofb)14)(B) (1994)).
402. Securities Exchange Act Amendments of 1936. ch. 462, sec. 3. § 15(b). 49 Stat. 1375.
1378 (1936) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(4),C) (1994)).
403. See Securities Exchange Act Amendments of 1936. ch. 462. see. 3. § 15(bt. 49 Stat. 1375,
1378 (1936) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)14)ID) ( 1994)).
404. Securities Exchange Act Amendments of 1936. ch. 462. sec. 3. § 151bl. 49 Stat. 1375.
1378 (1936) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78otb)l4) (1994)).
405. See SEC, 3 ANN. REPORT 27 (1937).
406. See House Unlisted Securities Hearing. supra note 396. at 11-12 (statement of James
Landis, Chairman, SEC).
407. Securities Exchange Act Amendments of 1936. ch. 462. see. 3.§ 151c). 49 Stat. 1375.
1378 (1936) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78ote)(1 I(A) (1994)).
408. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, § 9.48 Stat. 881. 889-91 11934) lcJified
as amended at 15 U.S.C.§ 78i (1994)).
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Section 15(c) reached "manipulative, deceptive or

other fraudulent device[s] or contrivance[s].'

4'0

Thus, by its express

terms, section 15(c)(1) reaches types of fraud in addition to those
reached by section 10(b).4t' The 1936 legislative history describes some
of these abuses, such as concealment and unfair discrimination.
In

conjunction with the Commission's authority, given in the same 1936
Amendments, to deny or revoke the registration of a broker-dealer who

willfully violates any provision of the Exchange Act,41' 3 section 15(c)'s
broad prohibition on fraud gave the SEC a powerful tool for policing44the

character of securities professionals in the over-the-counter markets.

'

Contemporary sources reveal some of the practices in the over-thecounter markets that motivated the SEC's program. For example, a few
weeks after the enactment of the 1936 Amendments, the SEC reported to
Congress on a study that had been mandated by the Exchange Act.4 " The
study considered the "feasibility and advisability" of segregating the

409. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, § 10(b), 48 Stat. 881, 891 (1934) (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1994)). Section 10(b) applies to any person. See id.
410. Securities Exchange Act Amendments of 1936, ch. 462, sec. 3, § 15(c), 49 Star. 1375,
1378 (1936) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78o(c)(l)(A) (1994)) (emphasis added). Section
15(c) only applied to broker-dealers in the over-the-counter markets. See id.
411. See generally Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983) (."[Wlhere Congress
includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same
Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate
inclusion or exclusion."' (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Wong Kim Bo, 472 F.2d
720, 722 (5th. Cir. 1972))).
412. As originally drafted, the section applied to "fraud, concealment, unfair discrimination, or
manipulative or deceptive practices." House Unlisted Securities Hearing, supra note 396, at 4
(quoting the text of the bill). When questions were raised whether this would support SEC
regulation of municipal securities dealers in areas other than fraud, James Landis indicated that the
section was intended to reach only fraud, and would be redrafted to eliminate confusion. See id. at
12-13 (statement of James Landis, Chairman, SEC) (describing "concealment, unfair
discrimination, and manipulation" as among the fraudulent practices the section was intended to
reach).
413. See Securities Exchange Act Amendments of 1936, ch. 462, sec. 3, § 15(b), 49 Stat. 1375,
1378 (1936) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(4)(D) (1994)).
414. The Commission takes the position that section 15(c)'s prohibition on manipulative,
deceptive or other fraudulent devices and contrivances is self-operative, meaning that no
administrative rule is needed to give it effect. See Brief for SEC at 34 n.46, Charles Hughes & Co.
v. SEC, 139 F.2d 434 (2d Cir. 1943) (No. 150). The legislative history supports this interpretation.
The bill initially made the section's prohibitions operative only when the conduct was in
contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe. See House Unlisted
Securities Hearing,supra note 396, at 4 (quoting the text of the bill). This language, however, was
dropped from the final Act. The Commission has also implemented the section in several rules. See
17 C.F.R. §§ 240.15c1-1 to 240.15ci-9 (2000).
415. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, § II(e), 48 Stat. 881, 892 (1934).
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functions of brokers and dealers.1 6 Among the problems identified in the
Report was the "tendency on the part of some over-the-counter dealers
to extort exorbitant profits from their customers."'t 7 However, this was
not, according to the SEC, a result of the combination of functions, but
rather, an incident of
48 the dealer function whether or not combined with
the broker function.
The 1936 Amendments show the logical progression of shaping a
moral vision into a regulatory regime. How does a regulator ensure that
only people of character undertake the business of securities? In 1936,
the answer was to eliminate the unfit, and to define unfitness in broad
fraud-based terms. It would be too much to say that the 1936
Amendments responded directly to a statement made by FDR four years
earlier in a closed meeting of campaign policy advisers. But the 1936
Act can be placed on an intellectual line of descent that begins with
FDR's decision to make character, not control, the guiding principle of
his policy toward the securities industry. Indeed, the links in that line are
few and direct: FDR to Kennedy, to administrative implementation, to
legislative codification. Moreover, the line did not end in 1936. A year
later the Director of the SEC's Trading and Exchange Division affirmed
its continuing force. One of the agency's prime objectives, he said, was
to bring the "full weight of federal authority against those persons who,
by past performances, had manifested their unfitness to remain in the
securities business."' 9 The Commission, he said, wanted to expel those
who adhere to "no principle of decent conduct; who ... shun the

methods of fair and honorable business dealing in favor of the weapons
of deception, fraud, pettifogging, cozenage and treachery."'1 After 1936,
only people of character, people who do not engage in prohibited
misconduct, would be permitted in the community of broker-dealers.
2. Exchange Act Amendments of 1938: Establishing Professional
Standards of Character and Competence
Officials of the early SEC urged the securities industry to think of
itself as an honorable, great and progressive profession."' They
416. See SEC, REPORT ON THE FEAsBILITY AND ADVISABILITY OF THE COMFLEIE
SEGREGATION OF THE FuNCTIONS OF DEALER AND BROKER iii (1936) [hereinafter SEC,
SEGREGATION REPORT].
417. Id. at 77.
418. See id.
419. David Saperstein, Address Before the National Association of Securities Commissioners 2
(Mar. 19, 1937) (transcript available in the SEC Library at 14 SEC Sp.eches. 1934-61).
420. Id.
421. See, e.g., Saperstein, supranote 363, at 4, 13.
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expressed their hope that it was ready to protect "professional and
business idealism,"4' and claimed that the securities laws gave it the
opportunity to create a "true and honorable profession. ' 4" Indeed,
administrators were already advocating this point of view in 1933,
during the brief period when the Federal Trade Commission regulated
securities.4 2 This type of thinking played an important role in the climate
of opinion of the 1930s and in 1938 it would be institutionalized within
the regulatory regime.4 "
The SEC's effort to professionalize the securities industry followed
an eventful history in the first few years of the Roosevelt administration.
An initial effort to organize the industry was made under the auspices of
the National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933 ("NIRA"). 26 General Hugh
Johnson, Bernard Baruch's representative on FDR's 1932 campaign
policy staff, led the agency that administered the NIRA, the National
Recovery Administration ("NRA"). 27 Johnson attributed the policy ideas
that motivated the NRA program to Baruch, asserting that Baruch's
speeches on business self-government "state[d] the whole philosophy of
[the] NRA."4" Baruch later sought to distance himself from this
program, saying that he had not been consulted in Johnson's selection
and that he was often unhappy with his measures. 42 9 Nonetheless,
whether Baruch approved or not, we can see the influence of his ideas on
Johnson and the NRA.
The NRA sought to eliminate unfair trade practices through
mandatory codes of fair competition prepared by trade associations, 43"
subject to NRA approval.43' Hundreds of codes were formulated and
approved. 432 They addressed a wide range of abusive business practices,
including, most commonly, misrepresentations and deceptive
advertising, commercial bribery, defamation of competitors, interference

422. Bums, supranote 345, at 2.
423. Bane, supra note 365, at 4.
424. See generally id.
425. See infra text accompanying notes 449-53.
426. See National Industrial Recovery Act, ch. 90, 48 Stat. 195 (1933). After this Act was held
unconstitutional by the United States Supreme Court, it was repealed. See 15 U.S.C. § 701 (1994).
427. See JOHNSON, supra note 157, at 251.
428. Id.
429. See BERNARD M. BARUCH, BARUCH: MY OWN STORY 252-53 (1957).
430. See LEVERETr S. LYON ET AL., THE NATIONAL RECOVERY ADMINISTRATION: AN
ANALYSIS AND APPRAISAL 551-77 (1935).
431. Seeid. at83-140.
432. See id. at 29 (stating that by early 1935, 546 codes and 185 supplemental codes had been
formulated and approved).

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol29/iss4/2

48

Walsh: A Simple Code of Ethics: A History of the Moral Purpose Inspiring

2001]

A SIMPLE CODE OF ETHICS

with contracts, false marking or branding, and false invoicing.

:

As part

of this effort, an Investment Bankers Code Committee prepared a Code

of Fair Competition for the securities industry:' Among other things, it
required investment bankers to adhere to "just and equitable principles
of trade and business."43 When the Exchange Act was later enacted, it

also contained a provision requiring securities exchanges registering
with the SEC to establish rules that would provide for the "expulsion,
suspension," or "disciplin[ing]" of members for conduct inconsistent
with "just and equitable principles of trade."4 '

Officials of the SEC

expressed their support for the NRA effort. As the Commission's first
General Counsel put it, investment bankers'

efforts to organize

themselves under NRA auspices represented "all that made the medieval
Guilds magnificent. 437
The NRA program came to an abrupt halt in 1935 when the
Supreme Court held that its mandatory codes were unconstitutional. 3
However, there had already been some suggestions that the investment
bankers code should be transferred from the NRA to the SEC." With the
SEC's encouragement, the Investment Bankers' Code Committee

remained in operation voluntarily, and worked with the SEC to shape the
legislation that would later become the Maloney Act. When the bill
finally emerged, it had no opposition."'

433. See id. at 570-77. The codes also regulated purely commercial practices like minimum
prices, methods of cost finding, rebates, and others. See id.
434. See NRA, Amendment to Code of Fair Competition for Investment Bankers (Mar. 23.
1934) (archival copy available in the Papers of Thomas G. Corcoran, Container 266. Folder I, in the!
Library of Congress) (on file with Author).
435. M arLIl, § 1.
436. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, § 6b), 48 Stat. 881, 8S6 (19341 jccdified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78f(b)(5)-(6) (1994)).
437. Bums, supra note 345, at 2. In the NRA era, the medieval guilds were vieved much more
favorably than they have been since. See, e.g., Harlan F. Ston=,. The Public Influence of the Bar,45
HARV. L. REV. 1, 4-5, 7-13 (1934) (stating that much like medieval guilds, professional groups
promote the general welfare by controlling their members and an, also needed in contemprary
society to restore fiduciary honesty). For a more current view, see M,'NCIIR OLSO.N. T1E RISE AND
DECLINE OF NATIONS: ECONOMic GROWTH, STAGFL-%TION, AND SOCIaL RIGIDITIES 125 119M2
(remarking that while guilds "provided insurance and social benefits for their members." thzy
"reduced economic efficiency and delayed technological innovation"P.
438. See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495,550(1935).
439. See Robert E. Healy, The Maloney Bill, Address at the New York Security Dealers
Association 1 (Mar. 10, 1938) (transcript available in the SEC Library at 7 SEC Speeche 1934-611
(stating that he seemed to recall such a proposal).
440. See George C. Mathews, A Discussion of the Maloney Act Program, Addres's Before the
Investment Bankers Association of America 1-3 (GeL 23. 1938) (transcript available in the SEC
Library at I1 SEC Speeches, 1934-61).
441. See 83 CONG. REc. 4447 (1938) (statement of Sen. Barrley).
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The resulting law took the form of amendments to the Exchange
Act." 2 It is usually referred to as the Maloney Act after its principal
sponsor." 3 The Maloney Act preserved NRA-style regulation in the
securities industry.' Contemporaries, however, took care to distinguish
it from the failed NRA experiment." They said that it established a
regulatory structure that was similar to the one applied to securities
exchanges." 6 There were differences, and they would lead to some
anomalies until the entire statutory structure for self-regulatory
organizations was revised in 1975.447 Despite these anomalies, for our
purposes, exchanges and associations were treated very much the same.
Specifically, the Maloney Act added section 15A(b)(7) to the Exchange
Act, which, like the defunct NRA Code for Investment Bankers, and
section 6(b) for exchanges, requires securities associations to have rules
designed to promote just and equitable principles of trade."8
Contemporaries explained the purpose they had in mind for this
enactment. The Senate Committee Report on the 1938 bill stated that the
legislation was intended to "protect the investor and the honest dealer
... from dishonest and unfair practices by the submarginal element in
the industry.""49 It was also intended to "cope with those methods of
doing business which, while technically outside the area of definite
illegality, are nevertheless unfair both to customer and to decent
competitor, and are seriously damaging to the mechanism of the free and
open market." 450 A securities association was expected to accomplish
these goals through cooperative regulation subject to the SEC's
supervision and supplementary powers of direct regulation. 451 Similarly,
an SEC official said that the legislation was intended to raise "the
standards of those on the edge to the level of the standards of the best."" 2
442. See Securities Exchange Act Amendments of 1938, ch. 677, 52 Stat. 1070 (1938)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
443. See, e.g., Marianne K. Smythe, Government Supervised Seif-Regulation it the Securities
Industryand the Antitrust Laws: Suggestionsfor an Accommodation, 62 N.C. L. REV. 475, 483 n39
(1984).
444. See infra text accompanying note 448.
445. See Mathews, supra note 440, at 1-2.
446. See id.
447. See generally S. REP. No. 94-75, at 22-34 (1975) (describing differences in the regulatory
structure for exchanges and associations and stating reasons for amending the Exchange Act to
make them consistent), reprintedin 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 179, 200-11.
448. See S. REP. NO. 75-1455, at 1 (1938).
449. Id. at 3; accordH.R. REP. No. 75-2307, at 4 (1938).
450. S. REP. NO. 75-1455, at 3.
451. Seeid.at4.
452. Chester T. Lane, Address Before The Seattle Bond Club 4 (Mar. 14, 1938) (transcript
available in the SEC Library at 9 SEC Speeches, 1934-61).
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Finally, the year after it was enacted, Senator Maloney said that it had
been "the purpose of Congress to provide the broadest practicable
opportunity for the knowledge and experience of the members of this
highly technical calling to be employed in the elimination of undesirable
practices and in the promotion of truly professional standards of
character and competence.'""
In 1939, the National Association of Securities Dealers ("NASD")
registered as the first and to date only national securities association. "
Its Rules were directed toward eliminating abuses that might lead to the
defrauding of investors, and to promoting just and equitable principles of
trade. 455 These Rules reflected the NASD's NRA-legacy. For example,
the NRA Code of Fair Competition had included a provision stating:
Where an investment banker recommends to an investor the purchase
or exchange of any security, [the investment banker must] have
reasonable grounds for believing [that] the security ...is a suitable
investment for [the] investor, [based upon] the facts, if any, disclosed
by [the] investor as to his other... holdings and as to his investment
situation and needs. 45'6
This provision was reproduced in the NASD's Rules.'" Now known as
the duty of suitability, it plays a central role in the relations of brokerdealers and their customers.4 s
The 1938 Amendments were based on a body of ideas that found a
home in the securities laws just as the Supreme Court was driving them
from the rest of the economy. Professional standards of character and
competence would be achieved through codes of conduct created and
enforced by business self-government. As with the 1936 Amendments, it
would be too much to claim that the Maloney Act resulted directly from
FDR's statements. Nonetheless, the 1938 Act can be placed on an
453. Senator Francis T. Maloney, Regulation of the Over-the-Counter Security Markets.
Address at the California Security Dealers Association, Investment Bankers Association. National
Association of Securities Dealers 2 (Aug. 22, 1939) (transcript available in the SEC Library at I I
SEC Speeches, 1934-61).
454. See Application of National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc., for Registration as a
National Securities Association, Exchange Act Release No. 2211, 5 S.E.C. 627 1Aug. 7, 19391
(granting NASD registration as national securities association). availableat 1939 SEC LEXIS 5O.

455. See id. at 631 (stating the findings and opinion of the Commission).
456.

NRA, Amendment to Code of Fair Competition for Investment Bankers, supra note 434,

at art. III, § 4.
457. See Rules of Fair Practice of the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc., art. III,
§ 2 (effective July 15, 1939), current version at Rules of Conduct § 2310.
458.

See Lewis D. Lowenfels & Alan R. Bromberg, Suitability in Securities Transartions,54

Bus. LAw. 1557, 1557-58 (1998) (opining that unsuitable recommendations are the most common
client accusation against broker-dealers).
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intellectual line of descent that began with the circle of policy advisers
who turned FDR away from the Brains Trust and shaped his final, moral
vision: FDR and Baruch to Johnson, to the NRA, to rejection by the
Supreme Court, to the Maloney Act, to the NASD's Rules. After 1939,
professional character was more than a moral aspiration. It was a
requirement of the regulatory regime.
3.

Investment Advisers Act of 1940: Professional Ethics for
Advisers
By the late 1930s, the reform period of the New Deal had run its
course.459 Foreign crises and eventually war would consume the
remaining years of FDR's presidency.4 ° The SEC, however, continued
to focus on the ethics and professionalism of the securities industry. This
purpose was reflected in its approach to the final fundamental building
block of the regulatory regime for the securities industry: the Investment
Advisers Act of 1940 ("Advisers Act").46'
Much like the Exchange Act Amendments of 1936 and 1938, the
Advisers Act resulted from a regulatory initiative of the SEC. As part of
a congressionally mandated review of investment trusts the agency also
studied investment advisers. 462 The Advisers Act was based on that
study . 63 By the time it passed, it was a consensus measure having the
support of virtually all advisers.464
Investment advisers' professionalism, and particularly their
professional ethics, dominated the SEC study and the legislative history
of the Act. Industry spokespersons emphasized their professionalism.
The "function of the profession of investment counsel," they said, "was
to render to clients on a personal basis competent, unbiased and
continuous advice regarding the sound management of their
investments." ' In terms of their professionalism they compared
themselves to physicians and lawyers.4 6 However, industry
spokespersons indicated that their efforts to maintain professional
standards had encountered a serious problem. The industry, they said,
459. See BRINKLEY, supra note 257, at 3.
460. See id.
461. Investment Advisers Act of 1940, ch. 686, tit. 11,54 Stat. 847 (1940) (codified as amended
at 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-I to 80b-20 (1994)).
462. See SEC, REPORT ON INVESTMENT COUNSEL, supra note 390.
463. See S. REP. No. 76-1775, at 19-21 (1940); H.R. REP. No. 76-2639, at 27 (1940).
464. See S. REP No. 76-1775, at 19; H.R. REP. NO. 76-2639, at 1.
465. SEC, REPORT ON INVESTMENT COUNSEL, supra note 390, at 34 n.43 (statement of Dwight
C. Rose, President of the Investment Counsel Association of America ("ICAA")).
466. See id. at 23-24 (statement of James N. White of Scudder, Stevens & Clark).
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covered "the entire range from the fellow without competence and
without conscience at one end of the scale, to the capable, well-trained,
utterly unbiased man or firm, trying to render a purely professional
service, at the other end." Recognizing this range, "a group of people
in the forefront of the profession realized that if professional standards
were to be maintained, there must be some kind of public formulation of
a standard or a code of ethics." ' As a result, the Investment Counsel
'
Association of America was organized and issued a Code of Ethics.
Nonetheless, the problem remained that the Association could not police
the conduct of those who were not members."'
The SEC Study noted that it had been the unanimous opinion of all
who had testified at its public examination, both members and
nonmembers of the Association, that the industry's voluntary efforts
could not cope with the "most elemental and fundamental problem of the
investment counsel industry-the investment counsel 'fringe' which
includes those incompetent and unethical individuals or organizations
who represent themselves as bona fide investment counselors."'
Advisers of that type would not voluntarily submit to supervision or
policing.4' Yet, all counselors suffered from the stigma placed on the
activities of the individuals on the fringe.4 Thus, an agency was needed
7 that could compel the fringe to
with compulsory 74 and national
476 powe
conform to ethical standards.
As a result of the Commission's report to Congress, the Senate
Committee on Banking and Currency determined that a solution to the
problems of investment advisory services could not be affected without
federal legislation. 4' In addition, both the Senate and House Committees
considering the legislation determined that it was needed not only to
protect the public, but also to protect bona fide investment counselors
from the stigma attached to the activities of unscrupulous tipsters and
touts.478 During the debate in Congress, the special professional
467. Id. at 40 (statement of Rudolph Berle, Counsel. ICAA).

468. Id.
469.
470.
471.
472.

See id.; see also id. app. H (ICAA Code of Professional Practice).
See id. at 40.
Id. at 41.
See id.

473. See id. at 43 (statement of Dwight C. Rose, President, ICAA).
474. See id. at 41 (statement of Rudolph Berle, Counsel, ICAA.

475. See id. at 43 (statements of James N. white of Seudder, Stevens & Clark and Dvight C.
Rose, President, ICAA).
476. See id. at 41 (statement of Rudolph Berle. Counsel. ICAA).

477. See S. REP. No. 76-1775, at 21 (1940).
478. See id.; MR. R-P. No. 76-2639, at 28 (1940).
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relationship between advisers and their clients was recognized. It is, said
'
one representative, "somewhat [like that] of a physician to his patient."479
The same Congressman continued that members of the profession were
"to be complimented for their desire to improve the status of their
profession and to improve its quality."4' °
The method chosen for achieving these goals was of a piece with
most of the prior legislation-fraudulent practices inconsistent with
these ideals were made unlawful. Specifically, section 206(1) made it
unlawful "to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud any client
or prospective client."48 ' Section 206(2) made it unlawful "to engage in
any transaction, practice, or course of business which operates as a fraud
or deceit upon any client or prospective client. ' 4 2
All of the themes of this history are reflected in the legislative
history of the Advisers Act. First, the Act was explicitly motivated by
the desire to protect and enhance advisers' professional ethics. 483 Second,
this objective was to be reached by prohibiting conduct inconsistent with
the ideal.4" Third, even associational self-regulation made an appearance
in the idea that all advisers suffered from the stigma placed on the
unethical fringe elements, and in the idea that federal regulation was
needed to support the industry's voluntary effort to establish a code of
ethics. 4 5 The Advisers Act came late in the New Deal, 486 but it reflected
the same moral purpose that had inspired administrators and legislators
throughout the 1930s.4
When FDR signed the Advisers Act, he recognized this legacy.
Since 1933, he said, it had been his "purpose to aid the honest
businessman and to assist him in bringing higher standards to his
particular comer of the business community. '48 "In every direction," he
said, "a conscientious and successful effort ha[d] been made to require
the investment banker, the broker, and the dealer, the security salesman,
479. 86 CONG. REC. 9813 (1940) (statement of Rep. Hinshaw).
480. Id. at 9814.
481. Investment Advisers Act of 1940, ch. 686, tit. II, § 206(1), 54 Stat. 847, 852 (1940)
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C § 80b-6(l) (1994)).
482. Investment Advisers Act of 1940, ch. 686, tit. II, § 206(2), 54 Stat. 847, 852 (1940)
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6(2) (1994)).
483. See supratext accompanying notes 462-69.
484. See supra text accompanying notes 481-82.
485. See supratext accompanying notes 471-80.
486. See BRINKLEY, supranote 257, at 3 (stating that "by the end of 1937 the active phase of
the New Deal had largely come to an end").
487. See id. at 49, 62-63 (discussing the New Deal's long term commitment to increase public
control of big business).
488. 86 CONG. REc. app. at 5231 (1940) (statement of the President).
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the issuer, and the great financial institutions themselves to recognize the
high responsibilities they owe to the public."" This statement
summarized FDR's policy vision. It also, in retrospect, illustrated the
policy's intellectual descent. Gerhard Gesell, then a young attorney for
the SEC, later indicated that he had written the statement, and that the
President used his text "verbatim."""
Gesell's flawless ghostwriting suggests that administrators
correctly understood the President's vision. Further, the legislative
program. they had pursued from 1936 to 1940 suggests that they believed
their own mission was the same as his-bringing higher standards to the
business community. Seen in this light, apparently isolated regulatory
initiatives for disparate industry segments can be understood as different
expressions of a consistent policy vision. Moreover, once that vision had
been institutionalized within the SEC, it would continue to influence the
agency's approach to the securities industry. This would quickly become
apparent in the Commission's enforcement program.
IV. THE NEW REGULATORY REGIME INCOURT: A SPECIAL DUTY
FOR BROKER-DEALERS

When Congress took up the President's securities legislation, it was
filled with moral purpose. Moral concerns were given special
prominence in the legislative history of the Securities Act: ' For
contemporary legislators, the Act was more than a condemnation of
fraud and more than a technical reform of the underwriting process. It
was the harbinger of a newly moral securities industry. Moral concerns
were given less attention during consideration of the Exchange Act.
Indeed, in 1934, congressional skepticism about the efficacy of a moral
policy ran high.492 Nonetheless, contemporary legislators gave concepts
like justifiable trust a central role in preserving society's economic
order.4 3 In short, in both legislative histories, moral concepts had entered
the realm of public policy.
Officials of the early SEC were also filled with moral purpose. The
Commission's first Chairman spoke of the role of character in restoring
confidence, and he described this phenomenon as finance's spiritual
489. Id.
490. Gerhard A. Gesell, 7e Trial of Richard Whitney. in THE MAIUIG OF THE NEW Dad.U

THE INSIDERS

SPEAK

139 (Katie Louchheim ed.. 1983) (describing this as a bill involving the

regulation of investment trusts).

491. See 77 CONG. REc. 2919 (1933) (statement of Rep. Raybum).
492. See 78 CONG. REc. 7690 (1934) (statement of Rep. Coopar).

493. See id. at 7691 (statement of Rep. Cox).
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dimension. " The first General Counsel spoke of confidence, morals, and
religion.4 95 Officials described their mission as one of morals, and their
purpose as the restoration of traditional standards of right and wrong.""
They described their approach as establishing simple and honest
requirements that were based upon principles of ethics applicable to both
business and to everyday life.497 In short, in the securities laws, they
believed law had caught up with morals.
The SEC had an opportunity to act on this moral purpose when it
set out to create regulatory institutions for the over-the-counter markets
and for investment advisers. From 1936 to 1940, the agency's legislative
program reveals the transformation of moral aspirations into the
requirements of a regulatory regime. In 1936, the SEC obtained statutory
authority to preserve the character of the securities industry through the
power to eliminate the unfit from among its ranks.4 9 In 1938, the SEC
worked with elements of the industry that had been active in the NRA
program to foster truly professional standards of character and
competence through the self-government of an association of securities
dealers.496 In 1940, the SEC recognized and supported investment
advisers' striving for professional status and ethics 9
These developments demonstrate the continuing power of the ideas
FDR had selected for his policy. They carried Congress and then the
SEC. However, in the American system of regulation, the courts also
play a critical role in deciding the success or failure of a policy vision.
The courts' response to the moral purpose inspiring legislators and
administrators would be a final milestone in the transformation of FDR's
vision into an established regulatory regime. This milestone was reached
for the first time in the Commission's enforcement action against
Charles Hughes & Co., Inc. ("Charles Hughes").: '
Charles Hughes was a registered broker-dealer? ° Acting as a
dealer, it sold securities to its clients at prices far in excess of the
prevailing market.0 Some clients paid almost forty percent over the

494. See Kennedy, supranote 359, at 10.
495. See Bums, supranote 353, at 7-10 (discussing the law's relationship in the context of the
complexity of civilization).
496. See Kennedy, supranote 359, at 10.
497. See id. at 5.
498. See supraPart II.C. 1.
499. See supraPart lI.C.2.
500. See supraPart II.C.3.
501. See In re Charles Hughes & Co., 13 S.E.C. 676 (1943).
502. See id. at 676.
503. See id.
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market price'0 4 As previously noted, as early as 1936, the SEC had
viewed this type of abuse as a matter of deep concern! "
In a line of administrative proceedings beginning with In re Diker
& Duker 6 in 1939, the Commission treated this type of conduct as a
violation of the antifraud provisions of the Securities Act and the
Exchange Act.5' 7 In these cases, the Commission found that "[i]nherent
in the relationship between a [broker-]dealer and his customer is the ...
representation that the customer will be dealt with fairly, and in
accordance with the standards of the profession. ': "It is neither fair
dealing, nor in accordance with such standards," the SEC continued, "to
exploit trust and ignorance for profits far higher than might be realized
from [a well-] informed customer."" Hence, exacting such profits
makes the implicit representation of fair dealing false, and the
transaction fraudulent.1' 0 In later cases, the Commission continued to
emphasize that a customer should be "consistently treated in accordance
with decent standards."'" "Not the whim of the dealer," the SEC said,
"but a strict
rule of fair treatment ought [to] govern the dealer's
512
conduct.
When the Commission brought an administrative proceeding
against Charles Hughes, the firm argued that the prices it charged were
neither unfair nor unconscionable.!' The SEC disagreed.' The
Commission recognized that permissible dealer mark-ups from the
market price had "not been fixed by any hard-and-fast rule or specific
schedule." ' However, the Commission continued, mark-ups such as
those charged by Charles Hughes "are so far in excess of what may be
regarded as reasonable that they unquestionably do violence to [the
504.

See id. at 683-84.

505. See SEC, SEGREGATION REPORT, supra note 416, at 76-77.
506.

6 S.E.C. 386 (1939).

507. See id. at 387-89 (analyzing conduct under Securities Act § 17fa) and Enchange Act
§ 15(c)(1)).
508. Id. at 388.
509. Id. at 388-89.
510. See Id. at389.
511. In re Trost & Co., 12 S.E.C. 531,535 (1942).
512. Id.
513. See In re Charles Hughes & Co., 13 S.E.C. 676, 678 (1943). In an argument not rlevant
here, Charles Hughes also challenged the methods employed by the Commission to determine the
prevailing market price. See id. at 678-79. Ascertaining the market price, and determining the

reasonableness of the dealer's mark-up have remained important questions in the application of this
doctrine. See 8 Louis Loss & JOEL SELIGMAN, SEcuRmES REGUL,,ION 3789-98 j3d ca. 1991)
(citing a number of cases addressing these questions).
514. See CharlesHughes, 13 S.E.C. at 679.
515. I
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implied] representation of fair dealing," made by every broker-dealer,
and absent disclosure by the dealer of enough information to enable the
customer to form an independent judgment upon
' 6 whether or not to
complete the transaction, they constituted a fraud.
The Commission continued that Charles Hughes' fraud was
emphasized by its efforts to induce an atmosphere of trust and
confidence with its clients." 7 The SEC expressly indicated that it was
reserving judgment on whether, by eliciting the customers' trust and
confidence, Charles Hughes owed them a fiduciary level of duty."'
Nonetheless, the Commission found that by leading some "customers to
place special reliance upon it," the firm "emphasize[d] its failure to meet
the minimum standards of fair dealing, and ma[de] the fraudulent nature
of its [conduct] more evident."" 9 In sum, the Commission found that
Charles Hughes' failure to disclose the size of its price mark-ups was an
omission to state a material fact necessary to make the broker-dealer's
implied representation of fair dealing not misleading 20 It revoked
Charles Hughes' registration as a broker-dealer.52'
When Charles Hughes appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit,'2 the Commission indicated that this was the first
appellate case to address the proposition that a security dealer "by reason
of the very nature of his business, impliedly represents to all his
customers that he will deal with them honestly and fairly and in
accordance with the established standards of the business."' In its Brief,
the SEC explained that its decision had been based on "the special nature
of securities and of the markets in which they are traded."'24 "[T]he
intricate nature of those markets," the Commission said, "has ...
plac[ed] dealers in securities in positions of special advantage with
relation to their customers and has placed upon them special
obligations."'' In effect, the Commission said, "the position of the
dealer is so specialized that the investor, as a practical matter, must rely

516. Id.
517. See id. at 680-81.
518. See id. at 681 n.7 (noting the conflicting evidence).
519. Id. at 681.
520. See id. at 681-82.
521. See id. at 682.
522. Appeals from the Commission's orders are made to the circuit courts of appeals. See
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, § 25(a), 48 Stat. 881, 901 (1934) (codified as amended at
15 U.S.C. § 78y(a)(1) (1994)).
523. Brief for SEC, supra note 414, at 6.
524, Id. at 15.
525. Id.
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for his protection almost entirely upon the probity of the dealer." ' "[I]n
many ways," the Commission continued, "the dealer in securities has a
position ...

analogous to that of [an] expert professional" who

"impliedly represents [to lay clients] that he will perform his
undertakings in accordance with the standards of the profession." This
was, said the Commission, an "application of the proposition that people
having special knowledge must live up to higher standards than are to be
expected in the old-fashioned horse trade where both parties are
presumed to be on more or less equal terms.","The Second Circuit affirmed the Commission's decision. It
agreed that an over-the-counter firm that actively solicits customers, and
then sells them securities far above the market price, must be deemed to
have committed a fraud. Since "[ilt holds itself out as competent to
advise ... it should disclose the market price if sales are ... made

substantially above that level.""' Considering Charles Hughes "as a
principal in a simple vendor-purchaser transaction," the court continued,
the broker-dealer "was still under a special duty, in view of its expert
knowledge and proffered advice, not to take advantage of its customers'
ignorance of market conditions."" 2 The court also said that the key to
Charles Hughes' success was the confidence it managed to instill in its
clients." 3 "Once that confidence was established, the failure to reveal the
[huge] mark-up[s] ... was both an omission to state a material fact and a

fraudulent device."'' "When nothing was said about the market price,
the natural implication in the [purchasers'] untutored minds ... was that

the price asked was close to the market." "5 "The law of fraud," the court
said, "knows no difference between express representation on the one
hand and implied misrepresentation or concealment on the other.""" The
court concluded this portion of its analysis by saying that "'[t]he best
element of business has long since decided that honesty should govern

526.
527.
528.
529.

Id. at 21.
Id. at 20-21.
Id. at 23.
See Charles Hughes & Co. v. SEC. 139 F.2d 434,438 (2d Cir. 1943).

530. See id.at 436.
531.

Id. at 436-37.

532. Id. at 437.
533. See id.

534. Id.
535. Id.

536. Id.
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competitive enterprises, and that the rule of caveat emptor should not be
relied upon to reward fraud and deception."'""
While this analysis appeared to dispose of Charles Hughes' appeal,
the Second Circuit went on to say "[w]e need not stop to decide,
however, how far common-law fraud was shown." 3 ' For, the court
continued, the business of selling securities has been subjected to a
program of regulation, including section 17 of the Securities Act.3 9 "Had
[it] been in doubt on the matter, [it] would have given weight" to the
Commission's interpretation of that provision.Y0 But it need not rely
solely on the Commission's views, the court suggested, because it was
ready to opine that "[tihe essential objective of securities legislation is to
protect those who do not know market conditions from the
overreachings of those who do."" "Indeed," it said, "it is the purpose of
all legislation for the prevention of fraud in the sale of securities to
preclude the sale of 'securities which are in fact worthless, or worth
substantially less than the asking price."' ' The Second Circuit
concluded that the Commission had correctly interpreted its
responsibilities to stop abusive practices in the sale of securities like
those perpetrated by Charles Hughes. 3
The Court of Appeals grounded broker-dealers' special duty on
their expert knowledge, proffered advice, and the confidence they instill
in their clients.5 This duty, the court said, arose even when they act as
simple vendors9 5 Nonetheless, in an aside, the court noted that Charles
Hughes might have been an agent and fiduciary for at least some of its
clients.m6 Like the Commission, the Second Circuit did not base its
decision on an agent-fiduciary analysis and thus, the relationship of this
M7 However, a
fiduciary-type analysis to the special duty was left unclear."
contemporaneous statement by a senior official of the SEC throws

537. Id. (quoting Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Standard Educ. Soc'y, 302 U.S. 112, 116 (1937)). In
FederalTrade Commission v. StandardEducation Society, the case cited by the Second Circuit in
CharlesHughes, the Supreme Court held that "[t]he fact that a false statement may be obviously
false to those who are trained and experienced does not change its character, nor take away its
power to deceive others less experienced." Id. at 116.
538. CharlesHughes & Co., 139 F.2d at 437.
539. See id.
540. Id. (citing to, among other cases, Duker & Duker, 6 S.E.C. 391 (1939)).
541. Id.
542. Id. (quoting People v. Federated Radio Corp., 154 N.E. 655, 658 (N.Y. 1926)).
543. See id. at 438.
544. See id. at 437.
545. See id.
546. See id. at 436-37.
547. See generally id. at 437-38.
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considerable light on this point. James A. Treanor, Jr., Director of the
Commission's Trading and Exchange Division, articulated two different
legal standards governing a broker-dealer's relationship with its
clients.
First, Treanor said, "the securities firm is typically in a professional
relationship with its customer."" The relationship arises because a
securities "salesman seeks to convince the customer of [his]
expertness[,] . .. [h]e invites the customer to disclose [information about
the] ... customer's financial resources and needs[, and then,] [o]n the

basis of [this] knowledge the salesman seeks to advise." ' "This is as it
should be," said Treanor, because "usually the relative value and merits
of the thousands of securities outstanding can be understood by the
layman only if he has the advice and guidance of a professional.""' But,
said Treanor, this manner of conducting business and giving counsel
makes the salesman and his firm professionals in the same sense that a
lawyer giving counsel is a professional."7 Therefore, the salesman and
his firm are the customer's agents; duty bound to "act with an eye single
to the customer's welfare," and required to fully disclose any adverse
interest they may have in the transaction. 3' Moreover, they cannot avoid
their obligations by characterizing their role as merely that of a dealer."'
Second, Treanor discussed a firm's obligations when it is acting a
"true dealer," that is, when it is selling securities in a "genuine arm's
length transaction." 5" Even in that case, he said, section 17 of the
Securities Act applies to the dealer's conduct, and that section makes it
unlawful "to omit to state a material fact if the omission makes
misleading the facts which are stated."' -t Treanor continued "[v]alue is,
of course, a material fact. Every time a dealer makes a sale of a security
he places a value on it and if that value is at material variance from the
market value, the dealer is under an obligation to disclose that market
value." 5" Treanor concluded by quoting the Second Circuit's decision in
548. See James A. Treanor, Jr., Address Before the National Association of Sewurities
Commissioners 2-7 (Dec. 12, 1944) (transcript available in the SEC Library at 14 SEC Speches,
1934-61).

549. Id.at 3.
550. Id. at 2-3.
551. Id. at 3
552. See id. at3.
553. Id.
554. See id.
555. Id. at 6.
556. Id. at 7.
557. Id. Treanor continued that "[ilf the failure of the dealer to make disclosure b.comns the
subject of litigation, what is a material variation will usually be a question of fact for the jury." Id.
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Charles Hughes for the proposition that "'[t]he essential objective of
securities legislation is to protect those who do not know market
conditions from the overreachings of those who do.'""3
Treanor's statement suggests that there were two lines of analysis
conflated into the special duty for broker-dealers. One is an agency
doctrine based on the nature of the dealings between the parties. When a
broker-dealer invites its clients' trust and confidence, and seeks to advise
them, it becomes a professional agent with fiduciary obligations! 9 The
other is a disclosure doctrine. Regardless of the nature of the parties'
relationship, whenever a broker-dealer discloses the value of a security

to a non-professional, it makes a statement of material fact."' That
disclosure could be materially misleading if the broker-dealer omits to
disclose that the stated price differs from the market price. 6'
In time, the two components of the special duty would be identified
as separate doctrines.162 The agency component would be known as the
Trust and Confidence Theory, and the disclosure component would be
known as the Shingle Theory. 63 The latter would be applied in a number

of settings.'

Finally, while some commentators have questioned its

current viability,

65

the courts continue to recognize it.:

558. Id. (quoting Charles Hughes & Co. v. SEC, 139 F.2d 434,437 (2d Cir. 1943)).
559. See Randall W. Quinn, Deja Viu
All Over Again: The SEC's Return to Agency Theory in
Regulating Broker-Dealers,1990 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 61, 75-76.
560. See id. at 72-73.
561. Five years after the Second Circuit's decision, Louis Loss also described this
phenomenon. He noted that even though the court considered Charles Hughes to be a principal in a
simple vendor-purchaser transaction, it analyzed the firm's special duty in light of its expert
knowledge and proffered advice. See Louis Loss, The SEC and the Broker-Dealer,1 VAND. L. REV.
516, 527 (1948). While there is some "element of advice and [informational] disparity" in most
cases, Loss continued, the disclosure doctrine in the case would be applicable even in an armslength transaction "where the customer was previously unknown to the dealer and can take care of
himself and was not solicited and received no advice from the dealer." Id. (opining that courts
would uphold this reading of the case).
562. See Quinn, supra note 559, at 72-76. In addition, over time, the special duty's basis in the
Exchange Act would migrate from section 15(c)(1) to section 10(b). See, e.g., SEC v. First Jersey
Sees., Inc., 101 F.3d 1450, 1468-71 (2d Cir. 1996) (analyzing doctrine under Securities Act § 17(a)
and Exchange Act § 10(b)).
563. See Quinn, supranote 559, at 72,75.
564. See generally Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 513, at 3780-85 (discussing the Shingle
Theory and relevant case law).
565. See Roberta S. Karmel, Is the Shingle Theory Dead?, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1271,
1296-97 (1995) (arguing that because of the Supreme Court's increasingly narrow reading of federal
antifraud provisions, the Shingle Theory has probably survived only because it is usually raised in
arbitration claims, not federal litigation). In this regard, it is interesting that the doctrine first
emerged under section 15(c)(1), since, as previously noted, that section has a wider scope than
section 10(b). Hence, even if the commentators are eventually proven right, the doctrine could
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In CharlesHughes, FDR's vision found a home in the courts. The
Commission's decision and its Brief to the Second Circuit were full of
the language of moral purpose, including fair dealing, the standards of
the profession, and the higher standards applicable to expert
professionals like doctors and lawyers! ' 7 The Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit responded and found that broker-dealers owe their
customers a special duty.!5 Contemporaries' moral purpose had been
successfully argued to an appellate court. FDR's vision had ceased to be
a moral aspiration-it had become a matter of decisional law.
V.

CONCLUSION

This history ends with three questions. Was FDR's moral vision a
serious policy initiative? Did he achieve his goals? What meaning does
it have for modem securities regulation? None has a simple answer.
Was FDR's vision a serious policy initiative? In the early 1930s,
investment bankers stood in the midst of the extraordinary losses in
securities that shocked the investing and saving middle class. ' The
bankers were ready culprits on whom the public could vent their anger
and frustration. As a result, the temptation is strong to conclude that
FDR attacked their morality simply as a political ploy. Even Tugwell,
one of the best sources on the inner workings of the 1932 campaign's
policy-making process, was of this view, having said that FDR used the
moneylending perpetrators of fraud as political "whipping boys."'' Of
course, Tugwell had his own bias. He complained that once FDR
rejected the Brains Trust's ideas, he encouraged the public to believe
that all of their economic miseries were due to "a few wicked individuals
who had transgressed some moral rules." '
The idea that Roosevelt attacked bankers' moral failings merely as
a political posture has a cynical appeal but it does not ring true. The
course of events within the campaign strongly suggests that his moral
remain valid in the over-the-counter markets. In other words, the Shingle Theory may b2 an
example of the "other fraudulent" conduct reached by section 15(c)(1).

566. See, e.g., Grandon v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 147 F.3d 184, 189-90 (2d Cir. 1993).
567. See generally In re Charles Hughes & Co., 13 S.E.C. 676 (1943) (illustrating throughout
the remnants of FDR's policy vision); Brief for SEC, supranote 414 (illustrating the same).
568. See Charles Hughes & Co. v. SEC. 139 F.2d 434,437 (2d Cir. 1943).

569. See supratext accompanying note 35.
570. TuGoEL , DFMOcRATiC ROOSEVELT, supra note 40, at 243. It should be noied that
Tugwell also said that unlike the "really satisfactory foils of Franklin's sixteen years on stage[.] ...

the electric utilities and the totalitarians," the moneychangers were "to be rehabilitated rathzr than
eliminated." Id. at 168.

571. TUG\wELL, BRAINS TRUST, supra note 39, at 518.
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vision was a serious choice. The turn to a moral policy required FDR to
overrule his principal policy advisers (including Tugwell) and to
backtrack on a major public position.572 The new policy was also
consistent with the ideas of Brandeis and Baruch, both of whom gained
admission to the campaign policy-making process just as the turn was
made. 73 Indeed, Brandeis and Baruch's intellectual contribution to
federal regulation of the securities industry is a lost tradition. "74 Much of
the spirit animating the federal regulatory regime can be found in their
ideas, including, for Baruch, the interpretations added in the line of
descent through the NRA . Attacking bankers' moral failings may have
produced political benefits, but restoring their ethics and professionalism
was a purposeful initiative.
Moreover, even if one assumes that FDR articulated his moral
vision simply to exploit popular anger at the securities industry, that
does not strip it of all meaning. His policy carried over from the
campaign into the regulatory process. Moral aspirations were prominent
both as Congress crafted the legislation that became the federal
securities laws, and as the SEC set out to implement and enforce those
requirements. Both Congress and the SEC focused on the moral purpose
of their work; on the need to restore old fashioned business ethics; on the
connection between economic confidence and the honesty and
trustworthiness of financial intermediaries; and on the need to enhance
the professionalism of the securities industry, both by prohibiting
conduct inconsistent with their ethical aspirations, and by eliminating
the unfit. 76 FDR's contemporaries took him seriously, whether modem
observers choose to or not.
Did FDR achieve his goals? This question could pose serious
analytical difficulties. Given the aspirational content of his vision-he
spoke of "men of character"; "ancient truths"; more noble social values;
and honesty, honor, the sacredness of obligation, faithful protection, and
unselfish performance---one could be left wondering what precise
regulations would suffice. However, once in office, FDR identified two
specific measures that would implement his vision. These statements

572. See supraPart II.A.2.
573. See supratext accompanying notes 249-51.
574. Brandeis' intellectual contribution to the securities laws' full disclosure regime is widely
recognized. See MASON, supranote 117, at 615.
575. See supra text accompanying notes 426-28.
576. See supraPart IM.
577. Roosevelt, supranote 206, at 12.
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provide a means for evaluating the extent to which the regulatory regime
reflects his goals.
FDR told the press in March 1933 that his principal objective was
to restore the idea that dealers in securities, both new and old, and
people who worked on exchanges, are fiduciaries!" Did he succeed? To
varying degrees, there are fiduciary or fiduciary-like standards in the
regulatory regime for investment advisers, underwriters, and brokerdealers.
Investment advisers are fiduciaries. In 1963, the Supreme Court
read the legislative history for the Advisers Act, and decisively
concluded that investment advisers are fiduciaries for their clients."
FDR did not specifically mention advisers in 1933, which is
understandable because it was only during the 1930s that investment
counsel began to publicly identify themselves as a separate component
of the securities industry. ' Nonetheless, their professional status
represents the fullest accomplishment of the Brandeisian strand in
FDR's policy vision. Advisers are professional fiduciaries who must
exercise disinterested judgment on their clients' behalf."3 '
In addition, underwriters' investigation of registered offerings is
measured by a fiduciary-like standard. In 1933, the standard was
explicitly fiduciary. ' In 1934, the term "fiduciary" was removed, but
the revised standard was drafted with the intent to make it fiduciary in
all but name. ' In the legislative history of the Securities Act, this
standard was explicitly linked to an underwriter's moral responsibility. 2 '
Finally, broker-dealers' special duty reflects an effort to vest them
with the responsibilities of expert professionals. Only the agency
component of this duty, properly speaking, gives rise to a fiduciary level
of responsibility.!"5 Yet, as commentators have noted, the agency and
disclosure components of the duty tend to blend into each other."" This
is no accident, because both are derived from the same historical
purpose. The special duty arose from the policy vision that brokerdealers should treat their clients honestly, fairly, and in accord writh
578. See Roosevelt, supranote 225, at 89.
579.
580.
581.
582.

See SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 18, 191-9211963).
See supratext accompanying notes 465-69.
See CapitalGains ResearchBureau, Inc., 375 U.S. at 191-9 1
See supratext accompanying note 298.

583. See supra note 328. The Supreme Court has indicated that liability undcr section 11 is
based on a negligence standard. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 203 (1976).

584. See H.R. REP. NO. 73-85, at 9 (1933).
585. See generally Quinn, supranote 559, at 75-76.
586. See id. at 78-79.
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professional standards." Hence, when broker-dealers induce their
clients' trust and confidence, they are agents and fiduciaries. At the same
time, because of their professional expertise, broker-dealers' statements
about the market can be highly material."' Thus, both of the legal
doctrines descended from the special duty that flows from the
contemporaries' moral purpose.
FDR's second suggestion was made to Richard Whitney, President
of the New York Stock Exchange." 9 In their meeting in April 1933, FDR
suggested a code of ethics that would be simple enough for the public to
understand 90 No one, however, could call the vast and complex
regulatory regime governing the securities industry a "simple code of
ethics."5 9' Similarly, one should be skeptical of any claim that the public
understands the regulatory regime's many technical requirements. Yet,

FDR's suggestion may not have been in vain. In the core standards
governing the public's relationship with the securities industry, there are
understandable, even intuitive concepts.
The statutory provisions enacted in the spirit of moral purpose were

of three types. First, conduct inconsistent with contemporaries' moral
aspirations was forbidden. Forbidden conduct included devices, schemes
or artifices to defraud, 592 untrue statements, 593 omissions that make
statements misleading,59 manipulation, 95 deception, 9' and other fraud.' 9
All of this conduct is recognizable as callous and selfish wrongdoing. "
Learned counsel debate the precise terms of these provisions, but the
public could easily understand their ultimate purpose-securities

587. See, e.g., Brief for SEC, supra note 414, at 6 (reasoning that "a security dealer, by reason
of the very nature of his business, impliedly represents to all his customers that he will deal with
them honestly and fairly and in accordance with the established standards of the business").
588. See Charles Hughes & Co. v. SEC, 139 F.2d 434,437 (2d Cir. 1943).
589. See Letter from Richard Whitney, to Hon. Franklin D. Roosevelt, supra note 234, at 8.
590. See id. at 5-6.
591. Id.
592. See Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, § 17(a)(1), 48 Stat. 74, 84-85 (1933) (codified as
amended 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)(1) (1994)).
593. See Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, § 17(a)(2), 48 Stat. 74, 84-85 (1933) (codified as
amended 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)(2) (1994)).
594. See id.
595. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, § 10(b), 48 Stat. 881, 891 (1934) (codified
as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1994)); Securities Exchange Act Amendments of 1936, ch. 462,
sec. 3, § 15(c), 49 Stat. 1375, 1378 (1936) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78o(c)(l)(A)
(1994)).
596. See id.
597. See Securities Exchange Act Amendments of 1936, ch. 462, sec. 3, § 15(c), 49 Stat. 1375,
1378 (1936) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78o(c)(1)(A) (1994)).
598. Cf. Roosevelt, supra note 206, at 11.
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professionals shall not lie, mislead, manipulate, deceive or defraud.
Second, the SEC was given authority to expel broker-dealers whose
professional misconduct demonstrates their unfitness to remain in the
industry.599 Again, the public could readily understand the ethical
purpose behind this provision-those who prove unfit shall be removed.
Finally, securities exchanges and associations were required to enforce
just and equitable principles of trade among their members.0 In 1938,
Congress indicated that it expected these principles to encompass
concepts "technically outside the area of definite illegality."' In the
years since, the courts have sustained the view that these principles
include ethical as well as legal concepts. 2 One of the more important of
these principles was also one of the first to be adopted by the newly
formed NASD, the duty of suitability.0' Judging by the volume of
arbitration claims relying on this duty," the public appears to
understand that they should expect suitable recommendations from their
broker-dealers.
FDR's suggestion of a simple code of ethics may have been
achieved after all. Indeed, the "code" established by these standards and
the fiduciary and fiduciary-like duties is very amenable to lay
understanding. Thus, within the larger mass of the regulatory regime,
there is a body of law and regulation that FDR might very well have
recognized as the type of simple code he had in mind.
What meaning does FDR's vision have for modem securities
regulation? In recent years, there have been several developments in the
securities markets and in the larger world that give renewed meaning to
FDR's policy and the measures he proposed for its implementation.
Confidence and crowd madness are receiving renewed attention as
powerful forces in the securities markets. In the 1990s, several
economies in Asia, Eastern Europe and South America experienced
devastating financial panics.60S Investors suddenly lost confidence in
599. See Securities Exchange Act Amendments of 1936. ch. 462. sec. 3. § 151b), 49 Stu. 1375.
1378 (1936) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(4) (1994)).

600. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, § 6(b). 48 Stat. 881, 886 11934) tcodified
as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78(f)(b)(5)-(6) (1994)); Securities Exchange Act Amendments of 1938.
ch. 677, sec. 1, § 15A(b)(7), 52 Stat. 1070, 1071 (1938) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.

§ 78o-3(b)(6) (1994)).
601. S. REP. No. 75-1455, at3 (1938); H.R. REP. NO. 75-2307. at4 (1933).
602. See Jones v. SEC, 115 F.3d 1173, 1178-80 (4th Cir. 1997).
603. See supratext accompanying notes 454-58.

604. See Lowenfels & Bromberg, supra note 458. at 1557-58.
605. Paul Krugman has described the similarity between current conditions and the 19303 as a
return to Depression economics. See generally PALL KRUGMAN1.
TII R Um,1OF DErztsstOw
ECONOMICS (1999) (surveying financial crises of the late 1990s).
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entire markets, and their simultaneous rush to withdraw triggered
panicked sales of financial assets and sharp declines in values.6

Economists are again ready to entertain the idea that exuberance, fear,
and other irrational motives play a decisive role in the capital markets.6w
Baruch's ideas about crowd madness and confidence would be at home
in the early twenty-first century.
Similarly, moral concepts are receiving renewed attention as

important elements in the creation of prosperity. This intellectual
phenomenon dates from the sudden collapse of the Soviet Union. From

an ideological, social and economic system covering a major portion of
the globe, Soviet Communism suddenly dissolved. Just as FDR and his

contemporaries tried to make sense of how the bubble economy of the
1920s could suddenly collapse, and found massive breaches of ethical

duty in the economic wreckage, the recent crash of Soviet Communism
has revealed stunning ethical failures in Eastern Europe."3 Indeed, in its
later stages, the communist economy in Poland bore a striking

resemblance to a gigantic, nationwide financial fraud.' Some
commentators have concluded that communism's final fatal failure was
its institutionalization of moral anarchy.1 ° In light of these recent and
extraordinary historical events, renewed attention has been given to the
influence of institutional regimes in shaping character, and the role of
character in producing social conditions at the macro level.6 '
Interestingly

enough,

Francis

Fukuyama,

one

of

the

leading

commentators on the historical meaning of the collapse of Soviet
Communism,

62

is also a leading exponent of the idea that cultural and

606. See CHARLES R. MORRIS, MONEY, GREED, AND RISK 206-29 (1999) (surveying financial
crises of the 1990s and comparing them to nineteenth century American financial panics).
607. See generally ROBERT J. SHILLER, IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE (2000) (analyzing
economic bubbles, crowd behavior, information cascades, and other irrational components of the
capital markets' pricing mechanism).
608. See generally Patricia A. McCoy, Levers of Law Reform: Public Goods and Russian
Banking, 30 CORNELL INT'L LU. 45 (1997) (discussing a number of the domestic failures fueling the
collapse of Russia's economic markets).

609.

See JOHN CLARK & AARON WILDAVSKY, THE MORAL COLLAPSE OF COMMUNISM:

POLAND AS A CAUTIONARY TALE 206-07 (1990) (characterizing Poland's economy as having been
dominated by massive lying and manipulation of information about inventories, output, and other
data relating to economic enterprises).
610. See id. at 204-07 (concluding that "[blad moral behavior drives out good, just as bad
currency drives out good").
611. See, e.g., ANGELO M. CODEVILLA, THE CHARACTER OF NATIONS 4 (1997) (stating that
"governments and the leading elements of society ... have a lot to do with supporting ways of life,
with tearing them down, or with building new ones").
612. See generally Francis Fukuyama, The End of History?, NAT'L INTEREST, Summer 1989,
at 3, 4 (stating that the end of the Cold war is not just the "passing of a particular period of postwar
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social institutions play a critical role in economic development. In Trust:
The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity,' Fukuyama
concludes that "a nation's well-being, as well as its ability to compete, is
conditioned by a single, pervasive cultural characteristic: the level of
trust inherent in the society."' He wrote that a high level of trust
reduces the danger of free riding on public goodsP' 5 and increases
economic efficiency by reducing transaction costs. 6 This type of trust,
Fukuyama holds, is a type of social capital based on moral consensus.""
In other words, moral trust and the conditions that create it have again
as foundational elements for a prosperous modem
been recognized
618
economy.
Perhaps the orthodox Progressives who attached themselves to
FDR after the 1932 Democratic Convention were on to something.
Perhaps confidence and moral trustworthiness are proper subjects for
wise public policy. FDR certainly thought so. In his policy vision he
sought to restore confidence by restoring the character of the people who
composed the securities industry.""' In other words, trust and confidence
would be restored when they were morally justified. Legislators and
administrators understood this vision and articulated it in various
ways. 2' In light of modem developments, however, one version stands
out. The legislative history of the Exchange Act states that in a highly
liquid economy, "[w]hen everything everyone owns can be sold at
once," trust holds society together. '2' "Just in proportion as [an economic
system] becomes more liquid and complicated, [it] must become more
moderate, more honest, and more justifiably self-trusting."' In other

history" but is "the end point of mankind's ideological evolution and thv universalization of
Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government").

613. FRANcts FuKuYAmA, TRUST: THE SOCIAL VIRTUES AND TIIE CRELTION OF PRtOSPERITY
(1995).
614.
615.
616.
617.
618.

Id. at 7.
See id. at 155-56.
See id. at 151.
See id. at 26.
At some level, these ideas have never fully disappared. The more insightful thinkers on

capitalism have long recognized the important role that morality plays in its ethos. Max WeLier, for
example, identified the "most important principle of the capitalist ethic [to be] 'honesty is the Ltzst
policy."' MAX WEBER, THE PROTESTANT Emic AND THE SPIRIT OF CAPITA ISM 151 (Tatzot

Parsons trans., 1958). Weber also found that honesty is a useful competitive tool. See MAX WEtER,
The ProtestantSects and the Spirit of Capitalism, in FROM MAX WEBER: ESSAYS I SOCIOLOGY
302,313
619.
620.
621.
622.

(IH.H Gerth & C. Wright Mills eds. & trans., 1946).
See supraPart ILB.
See supraPart I.L
H.1LR EP. No.73-1383, at5 (1934).
Id.
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words, in 1934, those creating the regulatory regime for the securities
industry had a pragmatic appreciation for the role of trust that bears a
striking resemblance to the principle Fukuyama would identify sixty
years later.
FDR's proposals for implementing his vision-fiduciary duties and
a simple code of ethics-also speak to modem times. Commentators
have recognized that fiduciary duties provide a legal basis for a
justifiable expectation of trustworthiness. 62' FDR's code should be seen
in the same light. As an effort to restore public trust in financial
intermediaries-why else make it simple enough for the public to
understand?-it represents a practical solution to a vexing problem. How
does public policy produce trust? More specifically, how does public
policy produce trust on a sufficient scale to influence an entire
economy? The idea of a simple code, containing basic ethical principles,
propagated across an entire industry, is a serious approach to the
problem.
Of course, the "code" that emerged from FDR's vision has not been
codified. It is scattered across multiple sources of authority: law and
industry rule, government and self-government, federal agency and
profession, statute and judicial doctrine. Ultimately, however, as FDR's
contemporaries repeatedly explained, their goal in all of these endeavors
was to bring higher standards of business conduct to the securities
industry. When that happened, investors would reward the industry and
the capital markets with justified trust and confidence. These ideas have
not lost their value. Through a code of conduct, simple, understandable,
and strictly enforced, the securities industry can demonstrate its moral
trustworthiness and accumulate the social capital of trust. That capital
should then help sustain investors' confidence when the market is under
stress. In sum, perhaps moral purpose has a place in securities regulation
after all.

623. See Frankel, supra note 231, at 1215-30.
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